“ DONALD J. TRUMP LEVERAGING U. S. SPECIAL FORCES TO COMBAT MEXICAN FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (FTOS) CARTELS.”

17 MARCH 2025

PREFACE

Thinking Outside the Laws: Learning from Criminal Mindsets

Governments often approach security challenges within legal and institutional frameworks, while criminals operate with no such constraints—exploiting gaps, loopholes, and unconventional tactics. What if, instead of solely relying on traditional methods, governments adapted their strategies by thinking more like their adversaries?

📌 Case Study: Pablo Escobar's Prison in Colombia

Pablo Escobar didn't just evade the law—he rewrote the rules to his advantage. When facing extradition to the U.S., he negotiated with the Colombian government to build his own luxury prison, "La Catedral", complete with a nightclub, soccer field, and personal security. In reality, it was less a prison and more a self-imposed safe house that allowed him to continue running his cartel.

💡 Key Takeaways:

✅ Criminals exploit systems—governments must anticipate and disrupt these loopholes before they become entrenched.

✅ Rigidity in law enforcement can be a weakness—creative, asymmetric solutions are needed to combat irregular threats.

✅ "Playing by the rules" is not always enough—governments must be willing to think outside the laws to outmaneuver adversaries operating without restrictions.

SOURCE: Sal Artiaga wrote via Linkedin

Monograph Statement: Exploring some inevitable questions. How do we halt Mexican cartels from exploiting the U. S border security measures for monetary gain, using the underground illicit economies of Fentanyl/Meth distribution, human and child trafficking, resulting in 325k missing minors and 300k + U. S persons poisoned to death.

MONOGRAPH


Cartel activity in Mexico, 2024
Activity based on analysis by Ioan Grillo/CrashOut Media, January 2024.
Sinaloa Cartel
Juarez Cartel / La Linea
Jalisco New Generation Cartel
Local Groups
Gulf Cartel
Disputed Territory
Northeast Cartel
Low Cartel Activity
La Familia
Key Border Crossings
Research Analysis, 2024
Tijuana
Yuma
Arizona
New Mexico
Texas
Baja California
Negales
Douglas
El Paso
Ciudad Juárez
Sonora
Chihuahua
Presidio
Del Rio
Eagle Pass
Chihuahua
Laredo
Coahuila
McAllen
Brownsville
Golden Triangle
Sinaloa
Nuevo León
Culiacán
Durango
Baja California Sur
Durango
Zacatecas
Tamaulipas
Cabo San Lucas
San Luis Potosí
Cancún
Nayarit
Aguascalientes
Yucatán
Guanajuato
Guadalajara
Querétaro
Hidalgo
Jalisco
Mexico City
Tlaxcala
Colima
Michoacán
México
Morelos
Puebla
Veracruz
Campeche
Tabasco
Guerrero
Acapulco
Oaxaca
Chiapas
Belize
Guatemala

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This research monograph is also prepared for:

National Security Threat Working Group Project (NST-WGP)

COMMITTEE on: Neutralizing U.S based Communist & Radical Islamist Threat Networks to the Homeland *CNC-RITNH)*

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For comments, questions, and suggestions, please email.

JR005-SENTRY-OPS@proton.me

SOURCE: https://www.crashoutmedia.com/p/mexicos-cartel-map-2024 (Grillo 2024)

The above map was acquired from Crash Out Media and is a product of Ioan Grillo's, a popular investigative journalist, specializing in Mexican Cartel activities."The map highlights the territorial control and influence of various drug cartels across the country, as well as key border crossings into the United States. The map is color-coded to show the regions controlled or influenced by different cartels and other local groups, as well as areas of disputed territory and low cartel activity. "

“Here’s a breakdown of the cartels and their respective areas of control:

1. **Sinaloa Cartel (Red)**: Predominantly controls areas in the northwest, including Sonora, Sinaloa, and parts of Baja California.
2. **Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Turquoise)**: Has significant influence in Jalisco, Colima, and Michoacán, extending into parts of Guanajuato and Guerrero.
3. **Gulf Cartel (Green)**: Operates mainly in the northeastern states such as Tamaulipas and parts of Nuevo León.
4. **Northeast Cartel (Orange)**: Found in parts of Coahuila and Nuevo León.
5. **La Familia (Brown)**: Controls areas in Michoacán and some parts of neighboring states.
6. **Juarez Cartel/La Linea (Yellow)**: Primarily active in Chihuahua and parts of neighboring states.”

“Additional elements include:

- **Local Groups (Various colors)**: Represent smaller, local criminal organizations operating in various parts of the country.
- **Disputed Territory (Purple)**: Areas where control is contested between different cartels or local groups.
- **Low Cartel Activity (Light shading)**: Regions with minimal or no significant cartel presence.
- **Key Border Crossings (Black squares)**: Important entry points into the United States, including cities like Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and McAllen.

(Grillo 2024)

Here’s an overview of the various cartels mentioned in the map and their characteristics:

Sinaloa Cartel

- **Overview**: One of the oldest and most powerful drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, founded in the late 1980s.

- **Leadership**: Historically led by Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán until his capture. Now believed to be managed by Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada and Guzmán’s sons, known as “Los Chapitos.”
- **Operations**: Known for its vast network for smuggling drugs, especially methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, into the United States and other countries.
- **Territory**: Predominantly controls regions in northwest Mexico, including Sinaloa, Sonora, and parts of Baja California.

Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)

- **Overview**: A rapidly expanding and highly violent cartel that emerged in the 2010s.
- **Leadership**: Led by Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho.”
- **Operations**: Engages in drug trafficking, money laundering, and extreme violence against rival cartels and government forces. Known for producing large quantities of methamphetamine.
- **Territory**: Has a strong presence in Jalisco, Colima, Michoacán, and is expanding into other regions like Guanajuato and Guerrero.

Gulf Cartel

- **Overview**: One of Mexico’s oldest cartels, originating in the 1930s.
- **Leadership**: Has seen many changes over the years due to captures and internal conflicts. Currently fragmented with various factions.
- **Operations**: Involved in drug trafficking, human smuggling, and other criminal activities.
- **Territory**: Strongest in Tamaulipas and parts of Nuevo León. Has lost some influence due to internal strife and competition.

Northeast Cartel

- **Overview**: A faction that splintered from the Zetas, a group originally formed by former Mexican special forces.
- **Leadership**: Led by former Zetas members, maintaining a violent reputation.
- **Operations**: Similar to the Zetas, involved in drug trafficking, extortion, and other criminal enterprises.
- **Territory**: Operates in parts of Coahuila and Nuevo León.

La Familia Michoacana

- **Overview**: Initially started as a vigilante group, it evolved into a major criminal organization.
- **Leadership**: Founded by Nazario Moreno González, known as “El Chayo,” and later led by José de Jesús Méndez Vargas, “El Chango.”
- **Operations**: Known for producing methamphetamine and employing pseudo-religious justifications for their actions.
- **Territory**: Mainly active in Michoacán, with some influence in neighboring states.

Juarez Cartel / La Linea

- **Overview**: A long-standing cartel based in Ciudad Juárez, historically powerful but weakened by conflicts with the Sinaloa Cartel.
- **Leadership**: Led by Vicente Carrillo Fuentes until his arrest; current leadership is less clear.
- **Operations**: Involved in drug trafficking, primarily marijuana and cocaine, and known for violent confrontations.
- **Territory**: Stronghold in Chihuahua, especially Ciudad Juárez.

Local Groups

- **Overview**: Smaller criminal organizations that operate independently or as subcontractors for larger cartels.
- **Operations**: Involved in various illegal activities including drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and more.
- **Territory**: Scattered across Mexico, often in regions where larger cartels have less control or in disputed territories."

(Grillo 2024)

For more on the topic have a look at IOAN GRILLO's Mexico's Cartel Map 2024.

This paper started out as a 6 page research paper. In this paper I hoped to deconstruct the flow of intelligence to support strategic decision making at the White House, Congress, and the executive departments and agencies. To do so required me to provide the overall background, methodology, and current state. I have decided to expand on the initial paper by adding current context as it relates to special operations forces, current and future possible military actions or escalation that can unfold with regard to US Forces Vs Mexican FTO's.

On February 19th the US State Department designated the following groups as FTO. Tren de Aragua (TdA), Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Cártel de Sinaloa, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), Cártel del Noreste (CDN), La Nueva Familia Michoacana (LNFM), Cártel de Golfo (CDG), and Cárteles Unidos (CU) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). Below is a screen capture of the entry in the US Federal Register published online.

FEDERAL REGISTER
The Daily Journal of the United States Government

Notice

rrorist Organization Designations of Tren de Aragua, Mara a, Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, nidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva choacana

State Department on 02/20/2025

PUBLISHED DOCUMENT: 2025-02873 (90 FR 10030)

DOCUMENT HEADINGS

Department of State
[Public Notice: 12672]

Based upon a review of the Administrative Records assembled in this matter, and in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, I have concluded that there is a sufficient factual basis to find that the relevant circumstances described in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (hereinafter "INA") (8 U.S.C. 1189), exist with respect to: Tren de Aragua (also known as Aragua Train); Mara Salvatrucha (also known as MS-13); Cartel de Sinaloa (also known as Sinaloa Cartel, Mexican Federation, Guadalajara Cartel); Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (also known as New Generation Cartel of Jalisco, CJNG, Jalisco New Generation Cartel); Carteles Unidos (also known as United Cartels, Tepalcatepec Cartel, Cartel de Tepalcatepec, The Grandfather Cartel, Cartel del Abuelo, Cartel de Los Reyes); Cartel del Noreste (also known as CDN, Northeast Cartel, Los Zetas); Cartel del Golfo (also known as CDG, Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cardenas-Guillen Organization); and La Nueva Familia Michoacana (also known as LNFM). (print page 10031)

Therefore, I hereby designate the aforementioned organizations and their respective aliases as Foreign Terrorist Organizations pursuant to section 219 of the INA.

This determination shall be published in the **Federal Register** . The designations go into effect upon publication.

Dated: February 6, 2025.

Marco Rubio,

Secretary of State.

[FR Doc. 2025-02873 Filed 2-19-25; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710-AD-P

Exploring some inevitable questions. How do we halt Mexican cartels from exploiting U. S border security measures for monetary gain, using the underground illicit economies of Fentanyl/Meth distribution, human and child trafficking, resulting in 325k missing minors and 300k + U.S persons dead.

BACKGROUND

At the time of this writing, the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel (CDS) followed closely by Cartel Jalisco New Generation cartel (CJNG), currently lead the way, attaining key, top positions, in the complex competition of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO's) of the world, they are also considered designated Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO's) and as of (01/20/2025) are now designated Foreign Terror Organizations (FTO'S). The illicit economy, especially consisting of illegal Fentanyl importation, production, and distribution to the US and European markets, the production and distribution of crystal meth and other illegal narco products is just one area of responsibility (AOR) where DTO's, TCO's, and some previously designated FTO's (such as Hezbollah) continue to flourish. They also capitalize on trafficking in persons (women, girls, boys), illegal weapons,other contraband, extortion of persons & legitimate businesses, murder for hire , racketing and assassination. As a direct result, over the last 6 years, in the US, over 400,000 US persons have been poisoned to death. Normally referred to in the media as "overdose deaths" it should be labeled as "chemical warfare deaths". Regardless, this is the leading cause of death in the US among males aged 18 through 45 years old. (U.S. Department of Justice,DEA,& Milgram 2024)

OFAC
Office of Foreign Assets Control

Sanctions List Search

Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list ("SDN List") and all other sanctions lists administered by OFAC, including the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List, the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List, the List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions and the Non-SDN Palestinian Legislative Council List. Given the number of lists that now reside in the Sanctions List Search tool, it is strongly recommended that users pay close attention to the program codes associated with each returned record. These program codes indicate how a true hit on a returned value should be treated. The Sanctions List Search tool uses approximate string matching to identify possible matches between word or character strings as entered into Sanctions List Search, and any name or name component as it appears on the SDN List and/or the various other sanctions lists. Sanctions List Search has a slider-bar that may be used to set a threshold (i.e., a confidence rating) for the closeness of any potential match returned as a result of a user's search. Sanctions List Search will detect certain misspellings or other incorrectly entered text, and will return near, or proximate, matches, based on the confidence rating set by the user via the slider-bar. OFAC does not provide recommendations with regard to the appropriateness of any specific confidence rating. Sanctions List Search is one tool offered to assist users in utilizing the SDN List and/or the various other sanctions lists; use of Sanctions List Search is not a substitute for undertaking appropriate due diligence. The use of Sanctions List Search does not limit any criminal or civil liability for any act undertaken as a result of, or in reliance on, such use.

Download the SDN List | Sanctions List Search Rules for use | Visit The OFAC Website

Download the Consolidated Non-SDN List | Program Code Key

Details:

Type:	Entity	**List:**	SDN
Entity Name:	CARTEL DE JALISCO NUEVA GENERACION	**Program:**	SDNTK; ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059; SDGT; FTO
		Remarks:	

Identifications:

Type	ID#	Country	Issue Date	Expire Date
Secondary sanctions risk:	section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886			
Organization Type:	Transnational Terrorist Group			
Target Type	Criminal Organization			

Aliases:

Type	Category	Name
a.k.a.	strong	NEW GENERATION CARTEL OF JALISCO
a.k.a.	strong	CJNG
a.k.a.	strong	JALISCO NEW GENERATION CARTEL

Addresses:

Address	City	State/Province	Postal Code	Country
				Mexico

Back

SDN List last updated on: 3/18/2025 10:04:19 AM
Non-SDN List last updated on: 1/15/2025 10:02:34 AM

CJNG

Drug Trafficking Organization

April 2021

Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act

U.S. Department of the Treasury
Office of Foreign Assets Control

Leader

CARTEL DE JALISCO NUEVA GENERACION (a.k.a. CJNG)

Designated April 8, 2015
Engaged in the trafficking of fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine to the United States

"El Sapo"



Gonzalo MENDOZA GAYTAN
DOB 02 Oct 1988
- Designated May 17, 2019
- Senior CJNG Member & Puerto Vallarta Plaza Boss

Individuals Linked to CJNG

Violent Actors Based in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, Mexico

Francisco Javier GUDINO HARO
DOB 29 Feb 1988; POB Mexico
(a.k.a. "La Gallina")

Carlos Andres RIVERA VARELA
DOB 19 Jun 1986; POB Colombia
(a.k.a. "La Firma")

Travel Agent Based in Guadalajara Area

Alejandro CHACON MIRANDA
DOB 22 Jul 1985
POB Mexico

AGRICOLA COSTA ALEGRE S.P.R. DE R.L.
Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, Mexico
SRE Permit No. A201611021236510536

- Agricultural company controlled by GUDINO HARO



These Puerto Vallarta-based CJNG members orchestrate assassinations of rivals and politicians using high-powered weaponry

DaleTours

DALE TOURS, S.A. DE C.V.,
Zapopan, Jalisco, Mexico
http://daletours.com

- Travel agency owned and controlled by CHACON MIRANDA
- Used to arrange travel for CJNG members and their allies, including trips that facilitate the movement of money and drugs

(Source: OFAC)

CJNG Fuel Theft Nework
September 2024
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Office of Foreign Assets Control
[New designees appear in red borders]
CARTEL DE JALISCO NUEVA GENERACION (CJNG)
Mexican cartel engaged in the trafficking of fentanyl and other deadly drugs to the United States
Designated April 8, 2015 (Kingpin Act) and December 15, 2021 (E.O. 14059)
Mexico based Senior CJNG Member
Mexico-based CJNG Members Related to El Tanque
Cesar CAZARIN MOLINA
AKA: "Tornado"
CURP: CAMC800206HVZZLS07
DOB: 06 Feb 1980
(Brother of Ivan CAZARIN MOLINA)
Domingo MEDINA DIAZ
AKA: "El Mingo"
CURP: MEDD611119HGRDZM01
DOB: 19 Nov 1961
(Father-in-law of
Ivan CAZARIN MOLINA)
Ivan CAZARIN MOLINA
AKA: "El Tanque"
CURP: CAMI841015HVZZLV05
DOB: 15 Oct 1984
REWARD
OF UP TO
$10,000,000.00 USD
FOR INFORMATION LEADING TO THE ARREST OF:
Nemesio Ruben Oseguera Cervantes
"El MENCHO"
CJNG Leader; Designated April 8, 2015
El Tanque's Mexico-based Fuel Front Persons
Jose Saul RODRIGUEZ HERNANDEZ
CURP: ROHS681005HOCDRL06
DOB: 05 Oct 1968
Jahir CAZARIN RAMOS
CURP: CARJ980318HVZZMH01
DOB: 18 Mar 1998
(Nephew of Ivan CAZARIN MOLINA
Son of Cesar CAZARIN MOLINA)
Gerardo ALVARADO CASTILLO
CURP: AACG880706HVZLSR00
DOB: 06 July 1988
Brandon Ernesto HERRERA MEDINA
CURP: HEMB930801HVZRDR05
DOB: 01 Aug 1993
Patricia RIVERA GARCIA
CURP: RIGP760313MVZVRT00
DOB: 13 Mar 1976
Santos Aldair ESTRADA MEDINA
CURP: EAMS940430HVZSDN07
DOB: 30 Apr 1994

The designation of an organization as a "terrorist" under current U.S. law allows for a dashboard of much more aggressive measures and counter-measures to battle the narco-terrorist. These include, freezing assets, seizing assets, blocking members from entering the US, and the prosecution of anyone who provides "material support to the organization. For Trump, it's a way to "get tough" on crime and secure the border.

SINALOA CARTEL – CHAPITOS NETWORK
PRECURSOR CHEMICAL SUPPLIERS
CHAPITOS
LEADERS
ILLICIT FINANCIERS
CLANDESTINE LAB MANAGERS
FENTANYL TRAFFICKING LEADERS
SECURITY AND WEAPONS TRAFFICKING LEADERS


SINALOA CARTEL
Illicit Drugs E.O. 14059
May 2023
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Office of Foreign Assets Control
All four members of Los Chapitos are indicted on U.S. federal drug trafficking charges
L to R: Ivan Archivaldo GUZMAN SALAZAR, Jesus Alfredo GUZMAN SALAZAR, Joaquin GUZMAN LOPEZ, Ovidio GUZMAN LOPEZ
LOS CHAPITOS
Father
Joaquin GUZMAN LOERA
A.K.A.: "El Chapo"
INCARCERATED
Designated pursuant to E.O. 14059
Member Of
First Cousins (Maternal)
Saul PAEZ LOPEZ
DOB: 31 Jan 1994
Nationality: Mexico
Joaquin GUZMAN LOPEZ
DOB: 16 Jul 1986
Nationality: Mexico
Mario Esteban OGAZON SEDANO
DOB: 14 Jul 1980
Nationality: Mexico
Owns
Raymundo PEREZ URIBE
DOB: 10 Feb 1951
Nationality: Mexico
SUMILAB, S.A. DE C.V.
R.F.C.: SUM010525IF9
Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico
URBANIZACION INMOBILIARIA Y CONSTRUCCION DE OBRAS, S.A. DE C.V.
R.F.C.: UIC100603PR2
Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico

The designations for groups Tren de Aragua (TdA), Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Cártel de Sinaloa, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), Cártel del Noreste (CDN), La Nueva Familia Michoacana (LNFM), Cártel de Golfo (CDG), and Cárteles Unidos (CU) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), allows for the use of military assets in the furtherance of US interest and objectives, which includes protecting its citizenry from harm. Both conventional (at border) SOF will be used as an instrument of power and not only at the point of failure of diplomacy, but throughout the diplomatic and SC process. The Defense Department views some of the operations as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). This is merely another government classification and activity identifier that is used to describe the following activities I

Figure III-1. Types of MOOTW Operations

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
OBJECTIVE
Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective
UNITY OF EFFORT
Seek unity of effort in every operation
SECURITY
Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage
RESTRAINT
Apply appropriate military capability prudently
PERSEVERANCE
Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims
LEGITIMACY
Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable

Figure II-1. Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

Currently the US is in a global competition referred to as the "Great Power Competition" (GPC) with near-peer adversaries, mainly China, Russia, but also Iran, North Korea, Cuba and other state and non-state actors.

The CCP has been offensively engaging the US for some time and is most likely using a battle methodology called "Unrestricted Warfare" by using the Mexican & Chinese underground illicit economic space as a CCP "gray zone" tactic in warfare. Chinese doctrine permits them to leverage any and all instruments of state power against the US in all domains. "Unrestricted Warfare" essentially dictates that all available methodologies of warfare be utilized, including,

but not limited to, unconventional war, conventional war, nuclear war, information warfare, cyber war, chemical warfare, biological warfare, economic, lawfare, psychological, media warfare and among many others, most especially, political warfare. One or several forms of warfare may be employed at once or, with any variation, within a domain. This type of warfare creates deliberate asymmetric threats, and seems to amplify desired effects and outcomes. One can also form a new Warfare as a subset of another warfare. (J.Robert) (CONGRESS 2024)

Highly likely, with the consent of the CCP, the Chinese Triads, 18k and other organized crime groups provide the Mexican cartels with the precursor chemicals required to produce deadly Fentanyl and its many analogs.(CONGRESS 2024)

After the chemicals are shipped to Mexican marine ports they are then transported to locations in Mexico to be synthesized by mixing, cooking and then packaging to create the final product destined for the U.S and EU markets, but only after first penetrating U.S border security measures. Some Fentanyl is pressed into counterfeited fake pills that are common to the U.S prescription drug market, such as popular medications like Adderall, Benzodiazepine, Hydrocodone, Oxycodone. Millions of these fake pills are cranked out and make it to market in the US. Additionally, the specially crafted black-market pill presses are manufactured in China and sold to Mexican cartels. Some Fentanyl is powder or paste form and now they have created a liquid format of Fentanyl and methamphetamine to easily avoid detection at the border. Other times they mix the Fentanyl with other narcotics like cocaine and heroin making these naturally cultivated drugs 50-100 times more potent, at only a fraction of the cost of naturally harvesting the coca plant or opium poppy derived products. (U.S.DOJ,DEA,& Milgram 2024)

SECURITY COOPERATION

Doland J. Trump has already taken the first steps of addressing the scourge of fentanyl by formally declaring war on the cartels. He would not have done this, if target packages were not built or at least some negotiation chip. No doubt, with all the tools available to him by designating them Foreign Terror Organizations there are a plethora of available options. Counter-Terror Financing comes to mind and OFAC & FinCen who will target financial networks around the world following a model similar to successful prosecution of Hezbollah cases. Leveraging sanctions and freezing their assets around the world will have a large impact. When you abruptly seize substantially large quantities of money, confiscate real estate and other assets, it can have a negative effect on one's morale and activities. However, the cartels likely have underground methods for stowing monies and for financial transactions similar to the Islamic world's Hawala networks, so not all operational finances can be targeted immediately; however many cartel leaders already have sanctions placed on them from their DTO and TCO statuses. There exists a special craft to successfuly hide assets from being targeted. The last set of sanctions were placed on members of Sinaloa (CDS). On March 22, 2024, OFAC determined that the property and interests in property subject to U.S.

jurisdiction of the following persons are blocked under the relevant sanctions authority listed

below.

Individuals:

1. LARRANAGA HERRERA, Jesus Norberto (a.k.a. "Chuy"; a.k.a. "El 30"; a.k.a. "Treinta"), Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; DOB 14 Apr 1993; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. LAHJ930414HSLRRS06 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 14059 of December 15, 2021, "Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade," 86 FR 71549 (December 17, 2021) (E.O. 14059) for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

2. LEON VALDEZ, Jesus Manuel (a.k.a. "El Guero de Las Trancas"; a.k.a. "El Guero Trancas"; a.k.a. "Guero de Las Trancas"; a.k.a. "Guero Trancas"), Las Trancas, Tamazula, Durango, Mexico; DOB 08 May 1977; POB Durango, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. LEVJ770508HDGNLS02 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

3. LIZARRAGA MARTINEZ, Victor (a.k.a. "El 20"; a.k.a. "El Veinte"), Tacuichamona, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; Pueblos Unidos, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; DOB 23 Mar 1972; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. LIMV720323HSLZRC07 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

4. LIZARRAGA SANCHEZ, Karla Gabriela (a.k.a. "LIZARRAGA, Gaby"), Mexico; DOB 14 Jun 1993; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Female; C.U.R.P. LISK930614MSLZNR04 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

5. NUNEZ HERRERA, Alan Gabriel, Mexico; DOB 29 Sep 1993; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. NUHA930929HSLXRL02 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

6. ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, Ivan Yareth, Calle San Felipe 3208, Fracc. Los Angeles, Culiacan, Sinaloa 80014, Mexico; DOB 01 May 1993; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. ROAI930501HSLBRV04 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

7. ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, Adilene Mayre (a.k.a. ROBLEDO, Adilene), Calle San Felipe 3208, Fracc. Los Angeles, Culiacan, Sinaloa 80014, Mexico; DOB 01 Sep 1997; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Female; C.U.R.P. ROAA970901MSLBRD05 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

8. TIRADO ANDRADE, Jesus, Mexico; DOB 01 Dec 1996; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. TIAJ961201HSLRNS08 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

9. VERDUZCO CASTRO, Rolando, Mexico; DOB 17 Mar 1987; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. VECR870317HSLRSL01 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

10. VERGARA MEZA, Alexis, Mexico; DOB 18 Jan 1996; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. VEMA960118HSLRZL05 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

11. VERGARA MEZA, Edy, Mexico; DOB 04 May 1992; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. VEME920504HSLRZD03 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted

to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.

12. MARIN GONZALEZ, Porthos, Calle San Jorge 4217, Fracc. Santa Fe, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; DOB 11 Jan 1996; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. MAGP960111HSLRNR03 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(i)(B) for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the SINALOA CARTEL, a person sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14059.

13. MARIN GONZALEZ, Arturo D'Artagnan, Mexico; DOB 09 Dec 1997; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; C.U.R.P. MAGA971209HSLRNR05 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(i)(B) for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the SINALOA CARTEL, a person sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14059.

14. GARCIA VELAZCO, Jorge Alejandro, San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora, Mexico; DOB 12 Jan 1987; POB Sinaloa, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Male; R.F.C. GAVJ870112DP3 (Mexico); C.U.R.P. GAVJ870112HSLRLR00 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(i)(B) of E.O. 14059 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the SINALOA CARTEL, a person sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14059.

15. GONZALEZ CORDERO, Mayra Gisel, San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora, Mexico; DOB 25 Sep 1985; POB Baja California, Mexico; nationality Mexico; Gender Female; C.U.R.P. GOCM850925MBCNRY07 (Mexico) (individual) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(iii) of E.O. 14059 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, CELULANDIA TALLER & STORE SLRC, a person sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14059.
Entities:

16. SMART DEPOT (a.k.a. "SMART DEPOT MAZATLAN"; a.k.a. "SMART DEPOT PUERTO CANCUN"; a.k.a. "SMART DEPOTMX TU CELLULAR AL INSTANTE"; a.k.a. "SMARTDEPOT"; a.k.a. "SMARTDEPOTMX"), Boulevard Sinaloa 1061, Las Quintas, Culiacan, Sinaloa 80020, Mexico; Avenida Reforma S/N, Gran Plaza Mazatlan, Local I29, Alameda, Mazatlan, Sinaloa 82123, Mexico; Boulevard Kukulcan KM 1.5, Local B32, Puerto Juarez, Marina Puerto, Cancun, Quintana Roo 77500, Mexico; Organization Type: Retail sale of information and communications equipment in specialized stores [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059].
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(i)(B) for having provided, or attempted to provide,

financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the SINALOA CARTEL, a person sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14059.

17. BUFALUSS (a.k.a. BUFALUS; a.k.a. "BUFALUBUFF"), Calle Cancun 1555, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; Calle San Felipe 3208, Fracc. Los Angeles, Culiacan, Sinaloa 80014, Mexico; Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; Organization Type: Restaurants and mobile food service activities [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059] (Linked To: ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, Adilene Mayre; Linked To: ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, Ivan Yareth).
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(iii) of E.O. 14059 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Adilene Mayre ROBLEDO ARREDONDO and Ivan Yareth ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, persons sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14059.

18. DULCE VOLCAN (a.k.a. "DULCEVOLCANCLN"), Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; Calle Cancun 156, Col. Isla Musala, Tachintle, Culiacan, Sinaloa 80065, Mexico; Organization Type: Restaurants and mobile food service activities [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059] (Linked To: ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, Adilene Mayre; Linked To: ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, Ivan Yareth).
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(iii) of E.O. 14059 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Adilene Mayre ROBLEDO ARREDONDO and Ivan Yareth ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, persons sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14059.

19. ROYAL ROOM DRESS (a.k.a. "ROYALROOMDRESS"), Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; Calle Justo Sierra 2976 (esquina con Boulevard Sabinos), Col. La Campina, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; Organization Type: Retail sale of clothing, footwear and leather articles in specialized stores [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059] (Linked To: ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, Adilene Mayre).
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(iii) of E.O. 14059 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Adilene Mayre ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, a person sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14059.

20. TOTAL LOOK (a.k.a. "OUTLET_TLOOK"; f.k.a. "TOTAL_LOOKCLN"), Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; Website www.totallook.mx; Organization Type: Retail sale of clothing, footwear and leather articles in specialized stores [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059] (Linked To: ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, Adilene Mayre).
Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(iii) of E.O. 14059 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Adilene Mayre ROBLEDO ARREDONDO, a person sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14059.

21. CELULANDIA TALLER & STORE SLRC (a.k.a. CELULANDIA TALLER & STORE SAN LUIS SON; a.k.a. CELULANDIA TALLER AND STORE SAN LUIS SON; a.k.a. CELULANDIA TALLER AND STORE SLRC; a.k.a. "CELULANDIA_SLRC"; a.k.a. "CELULANDIASLRC"; a.k.a. "CTS SLRC"), San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora, Mexico; Avenida Libertad y 14, Residencias, San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora, Mexico; Avenida Obregon y 18, San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora, Mexico; Website

https://celulandiatallerstore.negocio.site/; Organization Established Date 19 Aug 2017; Organization Type: Retail sale of information and communications equipment in specialized stores; R.F.C. GAVJ870112DP3 (Mexico) [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059] (Linked To: GARCIA VELAZCO, Jorge Alejandro; Linked To: GONZALEZ CORDERO, Mayra Gisel).

Designated pursuant to section 1(b)(iii) of E.O. 14059 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Jorge Alejandro GARCIA VELAZCO, a person sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 14059.

Dated: March 22, 2024.

Bradley T. Smith,
Director,
Office of Foreign Assets Control,
U.S. Department of the Treasury.

[FR Doc. 2024-07007 Filed: 4/2/2024 8:45 am; Publication Date: 4/3/2024]

There have also been confirmed connections between CJNG and Islamic terrorist groups. CJNG has adopted many tactics from these Islamic Groups to include drone warfare and anti-personnel mine warfare, some cartels have adapted special operations tactics and knowledge transferred from US S.F at Ft. Benning, Georgia and some knowledge gained by cartels from the Guatemalan Kaibiles, a controversial, yet elite, commando unit in Guatemala. The US has trained over five thousand (5000) Mexican soldiers in special tactics since the 1990's many former, retired, or defected commandos took their skill-sets and sold them over the years to the highest bidder (Source:Wikileaks), many to TCO's who've now escalated to narco-terror (FTO) status. Unconventional warfare skill sets can be worth a fortune for the opportunistic narco-terrorist seeking to strengthen his para-military force by simply hiring an tactics instructor, equipping them with the required knowledge, skills, and tradecraft to be effective tools of both influence and power. Over four hundred (400) Mexican military personnel were actually trained at Fort Benning by US Special Forces 7th Group throughout the years. All of us know that skills are perishable, thus are subject to diminishment of capabilities over time.

Continual training is a staple to all echelons and elements of the US military as a whole. Warrior ethos and fitness, both key components along with many others like, combat effectiveness, real time synchronized geographical ISR, multi-domain intelligence support, operational planning, rehearsal, plan execution, Unit Cohesion, Find , Fix, Finish, exploit, disseminate, surprise and violence of action all with the aim of winning, will all be utilized by US Forces to dismantle or destroy our adversaries.

Our military forces are still facing a formidable multi-domain threat, as they face the cartels within a host nation theater, with limited area of operations.

Many Mexican citizens have been won over by the cartels. Meaning the people side with cartel actions and ideologies over those of local or federal government . Essentially, many cartels have won the “hearts and minds” of the people, like RobinHood. On the flip side, there are just as many, if not more. who completely despise cartels and are disgusted by their very existence . Mexican and US SOF will face this divided citizenry and will have to decide who can be trusted

with operational intelligence. I'm sure this dilemma has been presented to many nations who have dealt with an insurgency. This is where we need to utilize our Civil Affairs teams, Psychological Operations teams and shape the information and operational environments in our favor.

The majority of the citizenry of Mexico must also be protected, minimizing civilian casualties and we must gain and maintain the public's trust rapidly leveraging HUMINT intelligence. A strong emphasis will be made on the topic of human rights, when US military trains and interfaces with Mexican counterparts. The fear that US and Mexican governments face is, public outcry of police abuse, human rights violations etc. The operational environment will, and is, just as much military/public safety, as it is high profile political. This is why we need to reshape the I/O and O/E.



Our partnerships are vital to hemispheric security, prosperity, and our collective ability to meet an array of complex security challenges. Working from a foundation of trust, mutual respect, shared interests in cooperation and interoperability, and pursuit of human rights to include gender integration, we recognize that we are a part of a broader team invested in advancing security, freedom, and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere.

We foster relationships across three broad categories of partners while incorporating these partners into our integrated deterrence efforts: USG agencies, Partner Nations and Allies, and civil society or "whole-of-society."

Currently, there exists an agreement between Mexican & US governments called the "Meridia Initiative" which consist mainly of security, enforcement, and narc-o-interdiction plans that go beyond the criminal aspect including intelligence sharing. This initiative has not been as successful as hoped for. There exists NO real "Security Cooperation Agreement" in the traditional sense. Three of the major key areas that have negatively influenced our progress are, the mass corruption of Mexican judges, governors, government officials, military leadership & rank and file, civilian police, and other elected officials in Mexico: the inherent issue of the US' serious problem with drug consumption and the huge systemic demand for these illicit narcotics; The PRC's negative global economics and political influence of our neighbors.

On Feb. 5, Secretary Rubio's spokesperson Tammy Bruce said, "Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke yesterday with Mexican Foreign Secretary Juan Ramón de la Fuente to discuss concrete actions to secure the U.S.-Mexico border, dismantle transnational criminal organizations, halt illegal migration, and stem the flow of fentanyl and precursor chemicals from China."

"Secretary Rubio thanked Mexico for sending 10,000 troops to our border Secretary Rubio and Foreign Secretary de la Fuente affirmed a mutual commitment to work together, as neighbors and partners," Bruce added. ("MSN," n.d.)

The Mexican cartels dominate the US market by cultivating much of their own products like marijuana, methamphetamine, opium poppy and coca. They play a key pivotal role by controlling all Columbian coca and direct land routes, which the Columbian market requires to successfully ship into the US. All cocaine that comes from Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador,

Peru and Venezuela must first pass through (as a transit point) Mexico and sometimes Guatemala. Cocaine cultivation and production has risen in Mexico in recent years similar to Colombia's neighboring Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

This comes after the U.S. and its Forces worked directly with the Colombian government through a "security cooperation agreement" named "Project Columbia." and closely advised Colombian Special Operations in addition to providing financial support. Through security cooperation agreements they took down the Medellin cartel and eventually armed guerrilla groups like FARC and ELN were dismantled.Recently leaked classified documents confirm that former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe had a criminal relationship with the Medellin cartel, Paramilitaries and Military mirroring some of the corruption in Mexico. Uribe was and still is a highly respected, historical, member of the Colombian government yet he was selected to fill these roles by the US, based on his relationships with all the key criminal players.

Mexico is very similar to the Colombia model with regard to the military. We have gone through this whole exercise in Colombia and Mexico in the 2000s. The Colombian military is composed of three branches: the Army ,Navy and the Air Force. The Army is the dominant service. All services play a role in the counter-insurgency campaign, but their participation is minor in comparison to the Army. Like Columbia, Mexico also has a sufficient fighting force with significant capabilities including Army, National Guard, Marines, Federal and State civilian police. Again, according to current, significant, reliable sources within Mexico's military and police ranks the severe levels of corruption runs a gamut and integrity seems to not even be a thing. CDS cartel is primarily responsible for the government corruption and it runs all the way up to President Shiebaum who emanates from the Moreno political party, which is known for being in bed with Sinaloa. AMLO, in particular, was completely obvious about the fact that he was collaborating with CDS . He is noted as having visited the specific town of Sinaloa at least six times during his tenure, the same town where Cartel Jefe (Boss) Joaqin Chapo Guzman was

born, raised and ruled from. Additionally, AMLO independently petitioned the US government attempting to negotiate the release of “El Chapo” several times, even after his two escapes. He was also observed at a private confidential meeting with Chapo's lawyer, not very fitting of a President. Claudia Shienbaum has made remarks that she intends to follow AMLO’s methodology with regards to “Hugs not Bullets” both of them clearly being socialist/Marxist like many other South American countries, I.e Brasil, Chile,Colombia, Honduras, Peru, Venezuela etc With this ideology they intend on not interfering with unlawful cartel activity, leaving them instead to operate freely throughout the country and US lands. This strategy known as “Abrazos, no Balazos” — or “Hugs not Bullets’ has had mass repercussions with a level of violence unheard of.

Sheinbaum has started revamping certain government programs to reflect this socialist ideology.

Narcotics such as the types being discussed here, especially Fentanyl, are extremely lethal, extremely potent, in micro-quantities, allowing for more quantity in smaller packages per shipment. Therefore, it’s highly concealable via persons and can be simply walked across the U.S border, carried in a backpack, purse, or even concealed in a human orifice.This is the most common of methods of transport, especially given the number of illegals who have entered the US and are easily manipulated to be mules. There is also data that suggest the majority of the mules bringing narcotics into the US are Americans working for the cartels seeking a quick buck. Other methods of the transport are to hide the contraband in vehicles crossing the border, usually within secret compartments, door panels, or trap doors, and inside the tires, the bumper and under the hood. Many times the narcotics are within legitimate commercial products being transported into the U.S. (U.S. Department of Justice,DEA,& Milgram 2024)

According to former Mexican Police Officer, Narco SME, Anti-abduction, escapology, unarmed combat, Unconventional-edged weapons, defensive tool and counter custody instructor Ed

Calderon, " The cartel will seek to exploit vehicles and their unwitting drivers/owners that regularly cross into the U.S, by secretly placing the illegal narcotics on that person's vehicle in advance, once they cross to the U.S side of the crossing, the cartel will follow the vehicle and proceed to retrieve the product, without the owner even being aware "."This type of operation requires pre-surveillance of the "subject" mule vehicle and study of its occupants travel habits" For me this very similar and reminiscent of U.S surveillance and counter-surveillance tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) pertaining to "Pattern of Life" recognition.Calderon also said, " Many Mexican locals in the Tijuana area, that work in the United States on a daily basis, are very privy to this type of cartel operation, always making sure to check their vehicles thoroughly, to ensure they aren't unwittingly being used and exploited to traffic narcotics."

Obviously if Customs and Border Protections (CBP) detects this contraband when entering the U.S, the vehicle owner will likely be arrested and prosecuted. While the cartel may lose a little bit of their product, they altogether avoid criminal prosecution, allowing their cross border operations to continue. Other methods the cartel utilizes include the infamous underground tunnel systems. In those methods both narco trafficking and human trafficking occurs. There are also cases where the cartel uses drones or UAS to fly-across the border and drop packages of Fentanyl on the U.S side. Stateside cartel members, associates or local criminal gangs or affiliates will retrieve the package and allow for distribution. Past Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reports indicated that Sinaloa has a physical presence, and is operating in all fifty (50) U.S states and CJNG is not far behind. (U.S. Department of Justice,DEA,& Milgram 2024)

As of Feb 15th President Donald J. Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have taken initial actions with regard to the recent Executive Orders issued by Trump. Trump issued an EO to secure the border as per his election mandate from the citizens of the US. He entered negotiations with Shienbaum that consisted with the threat of a 25 percent tariff on all imports from Mexico. At first Shienbaum publicly countered by threatening the same tariffs on the US.

Thus far they have already agreed to dispatch 10,000 Mexican troops to the border. Their function will be to blockade and thwart the flows of illegal migrants coming through the southwest border; and Halt the flows of illegal narcotics into the US perimeter. So far the migration numbers have already dropped down to 120 per day, down from 5,000 per day just 2 months ago.

Although this will certainly help remedy the volume of narcotics and illegals coming into the US, it won't all together stop the determined, greedy, narco-terror bosses from continuing to accomplish their intended goals, no-matter how many succumb to the poison. Money truly is Evil.

Knowing this, fairly current intelligence, from highly reliable sources, indicate that there are still several active, underground, tunnel systems leading from Mexico directly into the United States. Additionally, search protocols by CBP at Ports of Entry (POE), have ramped up hopefully detecting and deterring and the "CBPOne App" that former DHS Secretary Alexjandro Mayorkis implemented during the BidenAdministration, has been terminated from operation and app store download discontinued, eliminating this as a pathway of illegal entry into the US.

Some of these tunnels are wide and tall enough to drive vehicles through, which is scary considering the amount of drugs or weapons such as missiles or rockets that could be brought into the states. Or the volume of people that could be trafficked in a van. Other tunnel systems are small, narrow, and are only tall enough for a human to walk through, which is all that is required, to continue smuggling and trafficking operations in/out human beings, or backpacks full of fentanyl pills.

According to the drug enforcement agency (DEA) it costs five hundred dollars ($500.00) for a fifty-five (55) gallon drum of chemical precursor, shipped from China and that drum will yield the

cartels five-hundred thousand dollars ($500k) after it's all cooked, sold, and distributed. That's an enormous profit margin.

There is now additional credible intelligence reporting that not only is the CDS synthesizing Fentanyl throughout several, full neighborhoods in Sinaloa, Mexico, but that they highly likely have NEW Fentanyl laboratories in Canada, that are used as a distribution hub to US markets. It is unknown if this change is permanent, supplemental or temporary. They are possibly shifting operations away from Mexico, likely to avoid "direct action" military operations by the US and Trump's EO.

It should be noted that despite China dispatching chemist representatives to Mexico, to further instruct CDS on proper laboratory requirements, set-up, chemical synthesis, and operation. CDS in most instances throughout Mexico, sets up, and operates CRUDE, makeshift, temporary outdoor operations. Some of these operations consist of huge steel, industrial, kitchen pots and a boat oar or wood handle to constantly heat and stir the deadly chemical concoction. They sometimes kidnap the person who will be stirring the precursor chemicals, from a nearby town, forcing or coercing them into dangerous labor, for minimum pay. Many times these workers are not provided Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), such as a professionally sourced breathing respirator and they simply die from inadvertent inhalation or toxic skin exposure. Those that fall victim never return home to their families, since their bodies are normally hidden from discovery and usually never recovered. Information from another credible source in Mexico indicates that CJNG is planning to cut China out of the loop and commence synthesising their own precursor chemicals that can then be further cooked and mixed into fentanyl. If they were to create their own pre-cursors, they would be self-sustaining and not relying on the CCP shipments for production.

THE REAL BOOGEYMAN-

CHINA'S NATIONAL STRATEGY

"The PRC's national strategy is to achieve "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" by 2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military modernity to expand the PRC's national power, perfect its governance, and revise the international order in support of the PRC's system of governance and national interests. The PRC views the United States as deploying a whole-of-government effort meant to contain the PRC's rise, which presents obstacles to its national strategy. The PRC characterizes its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC leaders believe that structural changes in the international system and a confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying strategic competition between the PRC and the United States.

— In March 2023, Xi Jinping told delegates to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that "Western countries led by the United States have implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression against us, bringing unprecedented severe challenges to our country's development."

—The PRC's strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC in a "leading position" in an enduring competition between systems.

— In the 20 th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded on its calls to prepare for an increasingly turbulent international climate, while reporting it had "enhanced" the PRC's security on all fronts and "withstood political, economic, ideological, and natural risks, challenges, and trials." (USSOUTHCOM, Cmd. Priorities)

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the controlling party in China. Nothing escapes the parties control, especially being a digital surveillance state, where they have 24 hour

surveillance of the whole population. The CCP, specifically Xi Xiaoping's aspirations, short and long term goals of world dominance is using the "three warfares" as a guide, but more so following "Unrestricted Warfare" doctrinal approach; The CCP has proceeded to use Mexican FTO's as a delivery mode, and chemical/drug warfare: as a means for weakening and destruction of its adversaries (USA), and its ability to effectively reproduce a population by causing mass death, severely damaging a nation's faith in religion, intentionally causing mass demoralization, instilled distrust in a nation's government, cause societal instability, and directly impacting military recruitment by killing males aged 18-45, the prime recruitment age. In 2022 there was an average of two hundred (200) people per day dying from overdose deaths.

The fact about China is that more than 60 cases of espionage have been conducted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on U.S. soil, in the past four years, including the transmission of sensitive military information, theft of trade secrets, use of transnational repression operations, and obstruction of justice.

"According to the CCP itself, the battlefield will be everywhere. It already is. American sectors and communities targeted by the CCP include farming, business, K–12 schools, universities, research institutions, technology, energy, food supply, the defense industry, critical infrastructure, consumer goods, ethnic groups, religious communities, media, social media, Silicon Valley, Wall Street, and more. By getting Americans dependent on cheap and sometimes dangerous goods made in China, digital fentanyl like TikTok and actual fentanyl, the CCP is determined to achieve its goal of defeating America on the global stage. If we do not understand what the CCP is and that this authoritarian regime considers America its main enemy, we cannot secure our country.'

The CCP's methods are unconventional and may be hard to recognize, but its destructive ambitions to manipulate American minds, conduct espionage, steal intellectual property and

trade secrets, bring fentanyl into our country, and many, many more nefarious influence operations, are actively being pursued right under our noses. China's goal is plain: to defeat America. " The widespread threats posed by the CCP to the homeland are still rapidly evolving and expanding. The use of Irregular Warfare by the use of Mexican TCO's as a proxy force, and asymmetric delivery methods of chemical/drug warfare is a sure force multiplier. The CCP has stated that they can't control the export of the precursors to Mexico. It is also well known that in the PRC people caught selling drugs are sometimes executed. Source: (DEA Bi-Annual Report, 2024)

It has been noted within a US Congressional Investigation that the CCP government is completely complicit in the distribution of precursor chemicals to Mexican FTO. The denial is laughable. The CCP provides tax cuts and other incentives to the precursor manufacturers who assist in poisoning US persons..

According to the DEA, "The Chinese Communist Party's role in the deadly Fentanyl epidemic that has killed hundreds of thousands of Americans. The Fentanyl crisis is one of the most horrific disasters that America has ever faced. On average, Fentanyl kills over 200 Americans daily, the equivalent of a packed Boeing 737 crashing every single day. Fentanyl is the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18-45 and a leading cause in the historic drop in American life expectancy. Many around the world are suffering from addiction, and the destruction of countless families and communities has been seen. " Fentanyl and other mass-produced synthetic narcotics from the People's Republic of China (PRC) are devastating nations around the world. It is truly a global crisis." Source: (DEA Bi-Annual Report, 2024)


SINALOA CARTEL
CHAPITOS' FLOW OF FENTANYL INTO THE US
Source precursor chemicals from China to Mexico
Manufacture fentanyl into powder and pills at clandestine labs in Mexico
Commit violence to instill fear and maintain control
Smuggle fentanyl into the United States via land, sea, air, and underground, and distribute across the country
Launder money (through cash, goods, and cryptocurrency) back to Mexico
PRECURSOR CHEMICAL FLOW
USA
3. Fentanyl Distributed
2. Fentanyl Manufactured
MEXICO
1. Precursor Chemical Shipped

Source: Above two images property DEA, Annual DTA report.

Many times in the recent past, diplomatic measures and blatant direct requests have been made by the U.S to the Mexican government to stop the flow of narcotics over the border. Former Mexican president Louis Obador said, "that it was equally "the U.S's fault" and not an

issue of the cartels". I'm of the firm opinion that the U.S. government should not take unilateral military force off the table for a cause of action (COA).

The flows are proven



Taking a further step back in time, "In March of 2007, President George W. Bush privately met with Mexican President Felipe Calderon in the city of Merida Mexico. At that time a memorandum of understanding was entered called the Merida Initiative. This initiative that has been revisited multiple times over the years and is a bilateral counter-narcotics and "Security Cooperation"agreement between the U.S and Mexico to work on the areas of TCOS, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking etc." (CRS Report to Congress). In 2011, when it was again revisited it was provided 1.3 billion in funding covering a myriad of programs to provide better national security for both Mexico and the U.S.

Since about 2015, the United States by way of the DEA and CIA has been working with the Mexican government Intelligence agency CNI through a Security Cooperation Agreement. CNI received special funding to increase surveillance and intelligence activity of the cartels. In the past this has resulted in the dismantling of the Beltran Leyva cartel and numerous high value arrests have been made. One would think if this methodology is working, why not increase it to cover CDS and CJNG? I suspect, but have not confirmed that someone has become corrupted, thus putting a damper on operations. I didn't know if there was a funding issue or what? Through more research I found that AMLO, the predecessor to Claudua Shienbaum, essentially cut off all diplomatic relations (A PAUSE) in 2018, and therefore, law enforcement and intelligence sharing cooperation essentially stopped in the previous few years.

It's my understanding that a "pause" is not a normal accepted diplomatic process or stance on behalf of a nation. However, it's a made-up duplomatic tool by AMLO and Mexico has been exercising it , when they aren't happy with another nation's actions, decisions, stances etc. AMLO's reasoning for this was his dissatisfaction with Mexico's longstanding position of independence, and the protection of sovereignty of their country and the US disregard. He said he had no problem with US Ambassador Salazar and relations will continue between countries,

but not through embassies or consulates on a diplomatic level. AMLO's dissatisfaction was specifically with the State Department as a whole, with Antony Blinken at the helm.

However, as of now, we have recently acquired via Senate approval Secretary Marco Rubio who's assuming control of the State Department and USAID and backed by President Trump. Hopefully a dedicated, determined, knowledgeable, and Non-WOKE "Mexico Country Team " is properly assembled and stood up, in order to properly address Mexico, our issues, its diplomats, and their concerns, such as the illegal firearms imports that support cartel violence.

Its increasing focus on Mexico has necessitated a comprehensive and multifaceted approach by the United States military's USASOF, CIA, DIA, DOS, DEA to counter cartels and Chinese influence. Through a range of strategic initiatives, these organizations should aim to safeguard Mexico and US security, protect national interests and promote democratic values while mitigating the risks posed by the PRC's expanding presence. NORTHCOM, 7th Group can effectively counter that influence in Mexico by strengthening economic cooperation, leveraging soft power and public diplomacy, addressing military corruption, building upon existing multinational partnerships, fostering non-cooperation with globalalist entities, investing in critical infrastructure, and promoting regional security cooperation.


China's Smart Multi-Pronged Influence Strategy
United Nations
World Trade Organization
World Health Organization
World Bank
Int'l Monetary Fund
Interpol
IAEA
UNESCO
Int'l Telecommunications Union
Int'l Civil Aviation Organization
Int'l Maritime Organization
Int'l Labor Organization
G20
Arctic Council
1
Coopt Traditional Western-led Bodies of Global Influence
Create alternatives to Western constructs
Belt & Road Initiative
BRICS +5
Shanghai Cooperation Org (SCO)
ASEAN +3 (PRC, JPN, ROK)
China-India-Russia Trilateral Cooperation
China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA)
China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF)
China-LATAM & Caribbean States (CELAC)
China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
China-Pak/Nepal/Bangladesh Strategic Partnerships
China-Arab States Cooperation Forum
China-Central Asia Cooperation Organization
Pacific Islands Forum Dialogue Partner
Org of Islamic Conference Dialogue Partner
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements
G77
2
PRC uses all these constructs to enhance their legitimacy and influence, shape norms and standards, and exploit whatever agency each body has to offer
PRC is placing itself in old & new webs of influence to transform the int'l system of systems to accommodate its preferences. U.S. withdrawal further displaces the U.S.

(Image Sourced LinkedIn- creator Unknown)

"The country of Mexico is aligning with the Marxists to sue the American gun manufacturing industry for causing violence in the country of Mexico by the cartels. Mexico is suing gun manufacturers Smith & Wesson, Colt, Glock, and Beretta for $10 billion claiming that they are selling weapons to these terrorists, knowingly, and making it harder for them to combat crime.

First of all, gun manufacturers are not in the business of selling arms, knowingly, directly to a terrorist organization." (Col. Allen B. West (USA) (ret))

On the contrary, straw purchasers who can pass the background check and purchase the weapon will then turn around and sell them to criminals, who would not otherwise be able to pass the background check process. These are just regular Americans abusing their privileges

and rights to capitalize illegally, while also fueling TCO violence just south of the border. The other method for obtaining these weapons is resident criminals, members of a cartel that are statside or affiliates who operate elaborate car burglary rings, targeting lawful firearm owner's home residences and vehicles for theft. About 5 years ago I fell victim to this. I had taken my expensive M-1 Benelli Super-90 shotgun on an annual camping trip in the hills. After returning home, I didn't clear out the truck for a week, providing ample time for it to be swiped out of the rear hatch, which was pried open. It was buried under all kinds of equipment and out of plain view, but still accessible to the thieves. Lesson learned. Regardless, it's safe to say my shotgun is likely in Mexico or Haiti ! It doesn't help when your state Attorney General intentionally and illegally releases and publishes a list of registered California gun owners and their home residences via the internet.

Since 2011 300k + people have died unexpectedly in the U.S and directly at the hands of the Mexican cartels (FTO) via proxy of the CCP. It is well known that Chinese foreign nationals travelled to Mexico to instruct the cartels on Fentanyl synthesis, to set up proper labs, and use the correct ratio for mixing the chemical precursors.. It is well known that the Chinese Mafia own and operate most illegal marijuana grows in California and other states. Additionally, the Triads and other Chinese criminal groups provide robust money laundering services for CJNG and CDS using fairly elaborate methods to bypass authorities. (THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 2023)

It is well known that the cartels have given access to the illegal US marijuana trade to the Triads and other Chinese organized crime outfits, while the CDS explicitly dominates and controls the U.S. fentanyl, heroin and methamphetamine markets. (THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 2023)

China has full operational control of at least four (4) fully functional international shipping ports in Mexico, perhaps more. The known ones are Ensenada Port, Porta Manzanilla, Lazaro Cardenas Port, and Veracruz Port .There's also dozens, if not more, of "unofficial off books" ports throughout the coastal regions of Mexico. Multiple cartels currently control many of these small private ports and all of the local fisherman and the fisheries they occupy. They get a cut off each fisherman's daily catch. Cartels, but Sinaloa in particular, has access to and influence over local Mexican and some US meat processing plants. People that are on the payroll provide counterfeit or forged certification, labeling and packaging of illegally or improperly caught seafood that's out of season, such as fish and shellfish caught or poached out of season. The cartels even control when the fish will be harvested and operate industrial plants to freeze and package fish. The cartels are also heavily involved with poached Wildlife markets. China is one

of Mexico's largest customers when it comes to exotic wildlife black markets. The point here is, with all this other activity occurring at the shipping ports. How hard is it to bring in several 55 gallon drums of fentanyl precursor chemicals? Especially when the chemical labels are intentionally mislabeled to throw off port inspectors and receiving personnel and those receiving personnel are on the payroll of the cartel or more likely the port owners (PRC).

They have operational control of many other continental shipping ports. So lets say Mexican ports are on the stringent look-out for all shipments coming with a Chinese origin port of call. It would be very easy for the traffickers to ship their precursor chemicals to another port like say from Africa or South America and then proceed to re-ship the product, therefore creating a new port of origin that is not flagged or under scrutiny by authorities. In any case, the Mexican

receiving ports are likely staffed or supervised with Chinese nationals or TCOs who facilitate transfer of the contraband to the cartels.



As can be seen above the PRC has control of many shipping ports around the world per its plans of world domination. I've even been advised that the PRC operates at least 2 ports within the US or has some amount of control over them; however I could not locate any verifiable evidence of this statement for the purposes of this report.

Active engagement with our neighbors in Mexico, Central America, South America and the Caribbean contributes to regional and U.S. security. The U.S. military builds regional security through sustained engagement in order to deter adversaries, preserve stability, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges.

One last image on the issue on Chinese Foreign nationals, their operational activity and CCP accomplishments.

China has engineered a silent invasion of the US...

- PRC government & mercenary hackers continued pillaging of hard-won American intellectual property worth an estimated $250B-$600B each year, enabling China to now globally lead in 37 out of 44 critical technology areas.
- CCP cyber teams' incessant efforts to penetrate, map, and pre-stage malicious software into U.S. critical infrastructure like electric power grids, utilities, telecommunications, and transportation networks.
- CCP exploitation of tuition dollars, grants, and gifts they funnel to prominent U.S. colleges and universities to facilitate the PRC's access to STEM knowledge and critical technology research, which fuels copycat innovation, catalyzes civil-military fusion, and supercharges People's Liberation Army modernization.
- CCP pressure & inducements on American Sinologists to temper coverage of sensitive historical or contemporary topics that could otherwise shine a brighter light onto CCP behaviors, pathologies, & stratagems.
- PRC solicitation of American-based scientists to visit, lecture, and teach in China, or collaborate on research projects as part of the CCP's High End Foreign Expert Recruitment program.
- Chinese Student and Scholars Associations' collusion with PRC embassies and consulates to monitor their own citizens, restrict speech, and constrain academic freedom on American campuses.
- China Ministry of State Security (MSS) and Public Security (MPS) agents' travel to the U.S. under false pretenses to hunt, intimidate, harass, and render Chinese dissidents living here.
- PRC infiltration of American government labs, research institutes, technology centers, and cleared defense contractor companies.
- MSS elicitation through incentives, patriotism, and leverage over family members in mainland China to compel Chinese living in America to cooperate with PRC agents to relinquish U.S. intellectual property to their "ancestral country."
- CCP subsidization of fentanyl precursors for export to prolong a deadly drug crisis in America.
- CCP success in coercing major U.S. companies and organizations with commercial stakes in the PRC to kowtow to Beijing by verbalizing support for PRC policy choices, issuing public apologies when they might counter the party line, and self-censuring about PRC arbitrary business practices to avoid offending the CCP.
- CCP propaganda and disinformation efforts in the U.S. media ecosystem.
- PRC aggressive collection of big data, including from social media platforms like TikTok, to sharpen Beijing's widespread influence efforts in America, shape perceptions, amplify divisions, and fine-tune PRC machine learning algorithms to attain decision advantage in diplomatic, military, and economic matters.
- The CCP's strategy to promote sister cities/provinces and curry favor at the U.S. state and local levels through business dealings to create dependencies and indirectly shape federal policy choices regarding China.
- CCP cutout entities hiring U.S. lobbying companies to sway American politicians against any legislation Beijing deems disadvantageous to China.
- Brazen Chinese efforts to gain access to U.S. bases and national security facilities.
- Chinese-owned commercial ships and auxiliary vessels likely involvement in collection while near U.S. territories or operating in American ports, plus their potential to engage in sabotage such as severing seabed communication cables in a time of crisis.
- Chinese greenfield, brownfield and direct investments in property and infrastructure near sensitive U.S. military and government installations around the country to facilitate intelligence collection and potentially interfere in U.S. military operations during a crisis.
- Continued CCP enticements of a substantial number of American investors and venture capitalists to divert capital into the China market regardless of mid- to long-range security impacts to U.S. service members or Americans in the homeland.

—@MikeStudeman, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

CIVIL-MILITARY/POLITICAL-MILITARY

Cartels control most of the mayors in each town and have them in their back-pocket. Cartels have killed or wiped out whole town's in the past making it easy to shake down or put them on payroll.

One third of the regions experience (⅓) medium level of violence another ⅓ has extreme domination of municipal and state police, military officers and NCOs, some of our own guys/gals especially at CBP , also domination and control of drugs locally , oil theft from pipelines , billions per year, human smuggling and coyotes on the payroll. With all that said, somehow Mexican officials and the US apparatus must penetrate these networks that have a stranglehold.

Effective civil-military relations can dramatically enhance a partner nation's likelihood of reliably planning, developing, acquiring, manning, employing, and sustaining capabilities of mutual interest with the U.S. over the long term. Institutions are only as effective as their capacities to fight for resources, articulate challenges, plan for the future, and adapt. When civil-military relations are robust, resilient, and right-sized, there is a clearly defined role for security institutions and they are appropriately trained and equipped for the missions they undertake in support of those defined roles. It is also important that elected officials appropriate sufficient

resources for those defense and security roles and missions, and that they exert transparent and accountable oversight.



(Source: Image NATO training course material)

'The U.S. prioritizes engagement with willing partner nations working toward positive civil-military relations that are aligned with U.S. values and interests. Capable institutions are not luxuries, they are fundamental elements of national security. A central focus of the U.S. institutional capacity building approach to civil-military relations includes assistance with military professionalization, development of defense planning, leadership capacity building, and approaches to interagency communication and coordination. A successful capacity building approach facilitates knowledge, skills, and relationships that develop durably over time and across many different forms of civil-military engagement.



(Source: Image NATO CIMIC training course material)

To do this effectively, a multi-step process is followed that begins with assessment of the threats facing a partner nation and their institutional capacity for mitigating those threats. This requires analysis of the specific roles, missions, and resources of various security institutions. Strategy and plans are then developed accordingly, prioritizing specific courses of action and identifying opportunities to engage the interagency and improve coordination between organizations. Strategic communications about plans and actions are essential throughout this process to ensure ICB efforts are transparent to a broad audience and all participants.'

Finally, regular assessment, monitoring and evaluation of these engagements is essential for accountability and informs the ability to adapt as dynamics change.



(Source: Image NATO training course material)

"Security assistance has been part of our nation's history ever since the Revolutionary War. Since World War II, the USG has progressively institutionalized and leveraged security assistance as a tool to advance U.S. interests in a global environment. The term security assistance itself is subject to differing interpretations. The relatively recent development and use of the term security cooperation, which incorporates DoD-managed security assistance programs, has become the standard to describe all DoD international activities.

'If the past is any predictor of the future, security cooperation will be in existence for many years to come. In this regard, the words of former Deputy SecDef, William P. Clements, Jr., are as appropriate today as when they were spoken years ago: Many contend that such a program [as security assistance] has outlived its usefulness and is an anachronism in these days of a trend towards détente. To do so is not only to misread the history of the past twenty-five years but to misinterpret the signs of the times. The record is open to all who care to consult it. That record fully substantiates the conclusion that the world situation in which we currently find new hope for the future would not exist if the people of the United States had earlier refused to concern themselves with the common defense of the Free World. Had we not become involved and, for more than two decades, supported and encouraged the efforts of allied and friendly countries to protect themselves against threats to their territorial integrity and internal security, the complexion of the globe might be dangerously different today, and the international climate far more hostile." [Commander's Digest, July 12, 1973]

Over the past few decades the idea that the U.S should utilize its Armed Forces Special Operations Forces to help with putting the Mexican cartels out of business. SOF is a sure way to curb the Fentanyl crisis in my opinion, especially coupled with long range fires and UAS

surveillance and targeting capabilities. Currently, it is believed that the cartels have control over the Mexican Federal government. The corruption level is so high to the point it's entirely unheard of and at every level. Cartels also fight each other to be the top controller of the government. They use bribery and payoff officials at all levels to ensure their allegiance. This includes high ranking members of government and federal judges. To me this is the classic definition of insurgency. Perhaps it's not politically correct for them to be referred to this way, but when you have an organized criminal element/group (smaller than government) that actually has full control over the government of a sovereign nation state and its political outcomes, what is that called? What do we as Americans call it when a foreign country is allowing its people to penetrate our lawful borders and proceed to participate in activities that are killing our people in mass? INSURGENCY

It all sounds easy. Fortunately for the cartels we can't just let the dogs loose. The United States despite its woes still has the largest baddest Armed Forces and the largest Special Operations community at 87k special operators and support staff.. The U.S President along with the National Security Council, SecDef and Joint Chiefs of Staff must first review the law and military doctrine to determine how SOF can be used. This set of authorities is found in United States Code Title 50, which outlines the authorities given. Military Doctrine for Counterinsurgency is shown in Joint Publication (JP 3-5) and outlines the uses and mission sets for SOF units. If they have a battle plan I'm sure it's already been presented. Other involved entities would be NORTHCOM & SOUTHCOM, 1st Special Forces Group, and South America specialists 7th Special Forces Group.

After listening to a few experienced and retired members of the SOF community discuss this particular topic in theory, throwing out a concept of operations (ConOP). According to former Navy SEAL operator, commander & Iron-Clad Originals & Cleared Hot, Podcast Host Andy Stumpf, "a Task Force could be created using Texas as a HQ or operating base. The U.S Army

Special Operations Aviation 160th SOAR unit could base there, proceed to transport and insert SOF operating elements into Mexican territory for joint special operations." (IRONCLAD 2024)

His guest for the discussion panel included former Army Special Forces "Weapons" Sergeant Major, Mike Glover who is a subject matter expert (SME) instructor in Survival/Contingency Ops and Emergency Management stated," Different SOF teams could be systematically rotated in and out with ease, facilitating completion of the target objectives. " (IRONCLAD 2024) (FIELDCRAFT SURVIVAL 2024)

It all seems so simple as I said before. However, I never knew that the "Merida Initiative" existed, and Glover made a comment about the stability of the Mexican peoples, economies, government, etc all valid points coming from a former SF perspective in which his Alma matters ethos is working with indigenous and host nations "By, With and Through". I will admit my personal biases, when I first set out to write this paper and examine the questions I was being extremely biased. I have personally lost two dear friends to the Fentanyl crisis. Anthony Michael Munoz and Louie Matthew DeLa Cerda, both in their thirties with bright futures ahead of them. Tony left behind two young daughters before being poisoned to death by the CCP at the hands of the Sinaloa & CJNG cartels. They were both among hundreds of thousands of "casualties of war". Casualties of "unrestricted war", with a subset of Chemical Warfare as methodology. With this said, it's far easier for me with blinders on to say, go ahead and cut the dogs loose using kinetic direct action, burn their labs and make them pay. Looking at this situation from a different perspective I've thought long and hard and completed likely 30-50 hours of research on this as a whole, much longer before taking this class. Mexico is our neighbor and trade partner. They are a good economic partner and much more. I think despite the fact that they're our neighbor we need to revitalize discussion surrounding manpower, logistics, funding and support of the

"Meridia Initiative" coupled with Donald J. Trump's ability to successfully negotiate.



The impact the cartels are having on Mexico and the United States is devastating to both countries. For instance there have been 360,087 homicides since 2006, During the 2021 election cycle, 102 politicians were assassinated; 36 were candidates. During the 2018 election cycle, 112 politicians were assassinated. and 78,964 people missing and not found since 2006. ("ESSENTIAL NUMBERS | Mexico Violence Resource Project," n.d.)

The increase in kidnapping, murder, rape, extortion and forced dissappearence, are all related to the cartels activity. The criminal financing of operations such as money laundering, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and human trafficking are only surface level crimes they are involved in/ There's mass poverty and extreme violence. They decapitate people on the regular. They hang corpses from bridges, with cut off hands leaving them on full display in a grand effort to terrorize the public at large. They even cut off the genitals of males and stuff them into the deceased's mouth. Uncooperative citizens and other victims "disappeared" never to be seen again or perhaps to have their remains discovered in a secret dumping ground of decomposed bodies, only to have their DNA positively identified years later. This dictates that we take a different approach to the cartel's reign of madness. They are indeed ruthless. Knowing this I will examine the capabilities that the special forces have and determine which capabilities can be leveraged for the Mexican government to take back control of their nation.

PLAN COLUMBIA

After noting all the aforementioned successes one also can't ignore some of the major obstacles presented. I researched the subject further and came upon some leaked government documents that help explain what was going on behind the scenes within the Columbian and US military assistance.

The first military operation related to the Plan Colombia/Patriota was launched in 2004 and was dubbed Operation JM.

"In 2000, the U.S. launched a partnership called "Plan Colombia" to provide security and economic development assistance to help combat the spread of narcotics, train law enforcement, and promote economic growth. Since then, the country has seen a significant

reduction in violence and, while more remains to be done, has become a valuable security and economic partner—U.S. exports to Colombia have quadrupled to over $15 billion as of 2015. " (Sacquety and Colombian Military Forces, n.d.) ("Plan Colombia: A Development Success Story," n.d.) Those numbers may have changed since the government has become Socialist Marxist.

"A unique feature was that Colombian diplomats and military leaders came to Washington DC to garner support for the plan even before it was fully explained to the Colombian government. The Colombian leadership briefed Plan Colombia to Congress to gain not only the financial, but also the political support of the U.S. government. President Pastrana's Chief of Staff, Jaime Ruíz, wrote the first draft in English, causing rumors that the plan originated in the United States. The Colombians received Congressional support. Responsibility for Plan Colombia was assigned to the Department of State (DOS). Implementation would take place through the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá. (Jones, n.d.)

Using Columbia as a test landscape Mexico has presented the same problem set and it would behoove us to ignore our past successes and failures in security cooperation with Columbia. "Colombia is one of the strongest examples of the transformative effect of American engagement. U.S. security and economic assistance has helped the nation move from a cartel-ridden fragile state to a strategic ally and economic partner.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. grappled with the threat of a major drug war spilling over its southern borders— the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)undermined security and the rule of law in Colombia and across Latin America.

Here is an overview of some of the successes in SC with Columbia.

Overview of U.S. Foreign Assistance to Colombia

• Following the signing of Plan Colombia, U.S. military assistance helped the Colombian government fight the FARC and other drug lords, while also providing equipment to battle the spread of narcotics.

• U.S. development assistance helped train farmers to grow crops other than coca, improve yields, rebuild schools, and create new partnerships to help small producers get goods to market.

• The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) worked with private sector partners to help Colombia upgrade its energy infrastructure in order to improve access to electricity.

• The U.S. worked with the Colombian government to strengthen the rule of law by training police and implementing reforms to assist Colombians with land compensation.

Benefits to the United States and Latin America

• Since Plan Colombia began, homicides in Colombia have been cut in half, while kidnappings and terrorist attacks have declined by 90%.

• The Colombian military has become a valuable regional security partner that participates in multinational operational exercises.

• Colombia has become a model and trained over 11,000 police officers from 21 Latin American and African countries, as well as Afghanistan.

• The U.S. is Colombia's largest trading partner, with U.S. exports including oil, machinery, agricultural products, and organic chemicals.

• Today, approximately 250 U.S. businesses conduct operations in Colombia.

"In just a few years, Colombia has achieved a remarkable, indeed historic,

transformation in the security arena that few would have thought possible… from a

nation under siege from drug trafficking organizations and military groups to a country quickly becoming a lynchpin of security and prosperity in South America."

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 15, 2010

Although USAID is literally in the world spotlight currently (01/13/25), as they are being audited by the Trump administration's DOGE, headed by Elon Musk. Despite several controversial unearthed mass corruption cases, and exposure of fraud, abuse and wasteful spending, the need for such an agency is still an operational imperative. Despite the audit's findings, the agency (USAID) should either be completely gutted and then rebuilt or altogether shut down and a new agency erected in its place, with proper safeguards against corruption and wasteful spending and of course partisan politics. The most important aspect should be placing full oversight of the agency with a goal of transparency wherever possible.

Below are some of USAID's successes since 2000, in partnership with the Colombian government, they include:

• "Bolstered economic growth, contributing to a 30% decrease in rural poverty levels over 10 years.

• Increased private investment in rural Colombia, leveraging over $600 million of private capital from $47 million of USAID targeted investments.

• Planted more than 350,000 hectares of farmland with licit crops, like cacao and specialty coffee, increasing the security and economic benefit of hundreds of thousands of farmers.

• Supported 1,400 community-led projects, valued at over $487 million dollars, developed to strengthen communities and increase licit economic opportunities in conflict-affected municipalities.

• Ensured government protection for at-risk or threatened individuals, such as union leaders, human rights defenders, journalists, and municipal leaders, to carry out their activities.

• Enabled the establishment of more than 100 justice centers, providing citizens with quick, effective, and free access to justice services. Since 1995, 15 million cases, 65% of which are from women, have been reviewed.

• Helped ensure financial compensation by the Colombian government for more than 600,000 victims. While only 10 percent of registered victims, this is the largest number of reparations ever provided.

• Increased Colombia's capacity to address land conflicts and register titles through trained public defenders, improved access to vital land records, and the identification of over 1.2 million hectares of land available for restitution.

• Supported the reintegration of 13,000 demobilized ex-combatants and more than 20,000 community members into society. Provided 6,000 disengaged child soldiers with basic needs (food, shelter, health, education, and security) and rehabilitation support, while preventing the further recruitment of children by illegal armed groups.

• Developed job training program for 9,000 Afro-Colombian and indigenous youth; more than 8,000 of which have graduated and begun employment.

• Protected 800,000 hectares of Pacific Coast forest, capturing 2 million tons of CO2 yearly, through the forest conservation-focused business plans of 19 Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.

• Improved gold mining practices and reduced mercury use by legalizing and formalizing 150 small scale mining operations. Over 600 hectares degraded by illegal mining are now forestry plantations.

JOINT TASK FORCE-MEXICO-
THE SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY ANGLE

Why do we need SOF? SOF offers the means to achieve military objectives and to perform tasks that no other forces are able to conduct. SOF provides the US military with a rapidly deployable, small, discreet force when needed to avoid escalation and collateral damage.

Although SOF uses non-standard methods and procedures, the key to success lies with the individual operators at the tactical level providing the strategic- and operational-level effects. To set the conditions for success, an understanding of the principles of how to employ SOF is essential.

- Early presence of SOF is essential as the crisis develops to establish military and civil liaison; conduct area and threat assessments to inform strategic and operational planning; provide a forward command and control (C2) capability; advise friendly forces; and provide assurance to the affected nation or nations.
- Employed against high-value, high pay-off, critical targets that likely entail high political and military risk.
- Access to accurate, detailed, timely, and current intelligence is essential to ensure planning is tailored to mitigate the associated risks.
- Pre-emptive actions authorized to reduce adversary capabilities, either independently or in support of conventional forces, that may prevent initiation or escalation to a larger conflict.
- A clear and short C2 structure is essential to ensure integration with the joint force and allow delegation of authority to the lowest level possible.
- Timely decision-making enabled through the use of SOF liaisons at all levels to keep commanders informed, integrate national and SOF efforts, and synchronize effects across the spectrum of conflict.

Operations security (OPSEC) is maintained to prevent enemy information superiority, reduce risk of compromise in areas of high political or military risk, and maintain operational surprise. Special operations are an integral part of most campaigns and are conducted to achieve political, military, diplomatic, informational, and economic objectives. While special operations can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific US objectives, the majority of special operations are designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall campaign. SOF has been training Mexican forces since at least the 1990's. (WiKiLeaks)


ARSOF Model for Building Enduring Partner Capability
Partner Force Capacity / Capability
Indigenous Cadre Led / SOF Advised Efforts
Recruit / Vet Candidates
Connection to Host Nation Gov't
SOF connects partner force to legitimate government and legal processes
Force Generation Institution
SOF establishes institutional system for host nation force generation
Additional Cadre Identified in Selection Courses
SOF Advisor Developed / Led Formal Cadre Qualification Course
Army Special Forces Advisor Led Efforts
Recruit / Vet Candidates
Unit Leadership / Cadre Development
Recruit / Vet Candidates
SOF Advisor Led Assessment / Selection Course

(Source:USARSOF Literature)

Many are unaware that, already in existence is Joint Task Force-BRAVO, a subordinate Command of US SOUTHCOM. JTF-Bravo is located in Honduras at Soto Cano in Central America. JTF-B services the South American and Caribbean territories. Logistically it is not feasible to launch operations into Mexico from that location and we would be much better suited utilizing again the Colombia/Afghan model of force design and implementation. There is also a Joint Task Force-North and other specific commands. I do think it's possible to stand up a JTF

headquarters at a place like Ft Huachuca Arizona or one of the many bases within Texas borders. This JTF or TSOC or Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) HQs should be equipped to handle Multi-Domain Operations; Geospatial tracking and mapping; a large intelligence apparatus with full SIGINT collection and analysis capabilities, full Command and Control (C3) Communications and capable of handling large scale air operations manned and unmanned, provide support to tagging, tracking, locating, targeting operations and cyber operations.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENT: I can't research and write quick enough. As I am about to publish this monograph today, March 14th, 2025 developments on the S/W border operations have occurred. NORTHCOM released the following statement with regards to standing up a JTF. Looks like I was spot on with regards to the location of the new JTF-SB.

"PETERSON SPACE FORCE BASE, Colo. – *U.S. Northern Command activated a new* Joint Task Force *today at* Fort Huachuca, Arizona, *to tactically synchronize Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to secure and seal the southern border.*

Under the direction of USNORTHCOM, Joint Task Force-Southern Border (JTF-SB) assumed the role of synchronizer of several USNORTHCOM activities and military forces from Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N). *The transfer of authority, or TOA, to JTF-SB aligns efforts to seal the southern border and repel illegal activity under a single Joint Task Force responsible for full-scale, agile, and all-domain operations, which will allow for more effective and efficient DoD operations. Joint Task Force-North will continue their core mission of detecting and monitoring transnational criminal organizations' threats within and along approaches to the continental United States.*

"This is an important step in the whole-of-government efforts to seal the southern border and maintain U.S. sovereignty and territorial integrity," said USNORTHCOM Commander Gen. Gregory M. Guillot. "Joint Task

Force-Southern Border will lead as both the synchronizer of all joint capabilities and the land force commander for USNORTHCOM as we conduct operations on the Southern Border, building upon the excellent foundation set by Joint Task Force-North."

In early February, Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) from Fort Drum, New York, deployed to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to establish the infrastructure necessary for the JTF-SB headquarters. JTF-SB is commanded by Army Maj. Gen. Scott M. Naumann. *Additionally, the task force has two deputy commanders: one from U.S. Customs and Border Protection and one from the U.S. Marine Corps.*

"The Army has a nearly 250-year history of providing unique military capabilities for our national leaders. This mission is no different. From Imperial Beach, California to McAllen, Texas, we will employ those capabilities and technology to bolster the efforts of our interagency partners, in order to gain operational control of the border, as ordered," said Maj. Gen. Naumann.

Multiple Army units from around the country have been tasked to deploy as part of a sustainment support apparatus that will align under JTF-SB to enable additional units such as the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division and Marine Corps units to conduct operations at the southern border as part of JTF-SB. As of our last announcement on Mar.11, 2025, there are more than 9,600 service members deployed or approved to deploy who will report to or support this new Joint Task Force.

Several National Guard and Reserve units deployed in support of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) FY25 Request for Assistance. They too will align under JTF-SB.

USNORTHCOM was named the DoD's operational lead for the employment of U.S. military forces to carry out President Trump's southern border Executive Orders. The combatant command continues to fill critical capability gaps in support of DHS and Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

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NOTE TO EDITORS: For further information, please contact U.S. Northern Command Public Affairs at (719) 554-6889 or email us at n-ncpa.omb@mail.mil

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One major aspect that must be addressed and prioritized is the Security Sector and Reform. The major role in S&R efforts, in the broader context of cooperative security initiatives, may be to help reform the Host Nation (HN) (Mexico's) security sector and build partner capacity to make it an enabler for long term stability.

SSR involves reforming security institutions so that, under the control of legitimate authority, they can play an effective and accountable role in providing internal and external security.

It encompasses HN defense ministry reform, training and development, education and support for the enhancement of judicial and law enforcement institutions. This is especially important with the level of corruption we are faced with from the Mexican government.



SSR is the overall restoration or the transformation of a country's security and law enforcement institutions or apparatus which includes all participating actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated effectively, legitimately and accountability in a manner that is more consistent with sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.

Continued-

The Elements of SSR

The activities of military forces are generally focused on reforming the HN military forces, but those actions are only part of a broader, wide-ranging effort to reform the entire security sector, which is composed of individuals and institutions that provide safety, security and justice for the people of a state. **Figure B.1** illustrates the elements within the security sector, which includes the core security actors and related organizations. Execution of comprehensive SSR unites the following elements of the security sector.

1.Security actors, to include, but not limited to, military forces, law enforcement services, constabulary or gendarme forces, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian), coast guards, border guards, customs authorities, and reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias).

2. Management and oversight bodies such as the executive and national security advisory bodies, legislative and legislative selected committees, ministries of defence, internal and foreign affairs, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units), and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

3. Justice and the rule of law elements like the judiciary and justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen and customary and traditional justice systems.

4.Non-state security forces including liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies and political party militias.






Police Reform
Police Reform – institutions and actors
Ministry of Interior
Police Service
Finance Ministry
Parliament/Parliamentary Committee
Office of Police Ombudsman
Police Service reform requirement
Police Culture and Community Policing
Police Education and Training
Organisational Structure and Strategic Planning
Administrative Reform, Human Resources and Career Development
Police Accountability (internal, liaison with external and parliamentary oversight
Technical Equipment and Infrastructure

(Source:Above 3 images from NATO SFA Course)

SSR PROCESS

The military contribution to an SSR program should be incorporated within an overall HN strategic reform plan, which should be developed by the HN with support from all the stakeholders, including the intervention force (USA) where applicable, IOs, and NGOs. SSR has an explicitly political objective to ensure that security is provided in a manner consistent with internationally accepted norms, human rights principles and the rule of law. Security can be provided and governed by state and non-state institutions in many ways and ultimately is driven by a country's balance of power. Therefore, SSR is best approached as a comprehensive governance issue and not simply as a technical and military activity. All SSR programs must be coordinated during assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases.

These activities may be conducted:

- Across the full range of military operations
- Independently or with conventional forces
- In situations where politico-military considerations may require clandestine operations
- With the acceptance of a degree of political or military risk not associated with conventional operations
- To achieve strategic- and/or operational-level effects where significant political risk exists (NATO training)

It was announced today(2/15/25) that the US will be deploying an element of the U.S 7th Special Forces Group to train the Mexican Marines. 7th Group has a history of participating in several past training and development field exercises for these forces. The last training session was called "TRADEWINDS" and took place in 2022. (SOFX 2025). It is not very widely known that the United States has provided Mexico and its various forces with over 2000 sessions of Counter Drug training activity in the last few years. These trainings come in the form of formal

classroom instruction, enrollment in distance learning, a combination of the two called blended learning as well as workshops, seminars etc. Law Enforcement and military have trainined including many other civilian AORs. The training topics are various, such as “Recognizing and dealing with Corruption in Institutions” all the way to “Conducting Maritime Raids” and "Addressing Barricaded Subjects” by conventional and SOF forces.



(Source : Multi-Counterdrug Task Force: Image and stats are for US trainings and doesn't include Mexican organizations.)

Two members of the Mexican Navy's Marine Infantry stand guard on a pier in Baja California. (SOURCE: Government of Mexico)

I find it interesting that we aren't training with any of the existing GAFE units or any of the other special operations forces at this time. From what I've heard of, several elements of GAFE are deactivated and many members sent back to their parent commands. They have a history of being accused of committing illegal acts against the public, including murder and rape. On the contrary, there were over 2000 complaints filed against several military units around the country however only 20 plus percent proved true or held any amount of validity after thorough investigation.


Indig. Cadre Led / SOF Advised Qual. & Cadre Courses
SOF Advised Operations
Indigenous Cadre
TRADITIONAL AREA OF JOINT SOF SUPPORT TO ARSOF CAPACITY BUILDING MISSIONS.
Legitimizes capacity building effort; establishes means to pay, equip, and sustain the force
Essential for partners to sustain an enduring capability
Multiple iterations conducted over time, as needed, to grow the force while ensuring quality of training. Critical to keep student to instructor ratio low.

I highly suspect this is a regular scheduled training mission and may also be designed to grab headlines and perhaps persuade the criminal cartel's line of thought. It should be noted that this training signifies and opens the doors for future “security cooperation” . It's my opinion that the Marines were chosen purely from a “TRUST” perspective. As has been mentioned throughout this paper, corruption has reached all elements of the military. Selection of the Mexican Marines was likely due to the many past instances of GAFE members corruption and even defection to

the criminal element side. It is well documented from the past that 30 members of GAFE units left their military post, stole lessons learned from US instructors and then formed the notorious ZETAS cartel, a former protective faction of the Gulf cartel (CDG).

They then split from Cartel del Golfo and became their own cartel. They were responsible for several major atrocities involving killing and human rights abuses that made many headlines. We currently have some ZETAS leadership in custody and others from CDSand CJNG are on sanctions list.

Most recently (03/05/25), 'Rubén Oseguera González, alias el Menchito, son of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, el Mencho, leader of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), was sentenced to life imprisonment in the United States on Friday. The person in charge of issuing the sentence was Judge Beryl A. Howell, of the District of Columbia in Washington D.C., who also determined the payment of a fine of more than 6 billion dollars for having trafficked drugs to the United States. A jury found him guilty last September of charges of conspiracy to traffic drugs to the United States and use of firearms.

.' (**SOURCE: RIODOCE** /Borderland (**SOURCE: RIODOCE** /Borderland Beat)

Rubén Oseguera González, alias el Menchito, son of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, el Mencho

The Mexican Marines have a history of having successful missions, especially a recent 2018 rescue incident. Additionally, this marine unit is specialized and performs maritime responsibilities and mission sets. They are somewhat comparable to US Naval Special Warfare (NSW). Perhaps they will be directly targeting maritime operations of the cartel, better yet the Chinese controlled ports and their smuggling and shipping operations.I firmly believe this is just the first step in real "Security Cooperation". Maritime SOF operations, similar to land and air special operations, provide commanders with the capability to reach specific objectives that may not be achievable through conventional maritime capabilities and may require dedicated, specially equipped, and specially trained personnel who may use non-standard methods and procedures. Maritime SOF operations provide opportunities to insert or extract forces through the coastal, riverine, or maritime environments.

In support of conventional amphibious operations, maritime SOF operations can be used to complete discreet beach reconnaissance (including hydrographic survey), conduct discreet route preparation, and provide coastal reconnaissance.

In addition, maritime SOF operations can include coastal raids, ambushes, and assaults including opposed boarding operations; recovery of ships and maritime installations; and maritime CT.

Taking a step back in time again to Plan Colombia (2000-2010) and part two, named Plan Patriota (2010-2015) the same actions are precipitating today in 2025, within Mexico. Taken from Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr's write up "The Evolution of Colombia's National Strategy",

"The level of U.S. military involvement increased significantly. Because Colombia is a huge and largely roadless country, counter insurgency operations (COIN) in Colombia depended heavily on air movement. Helicopters were key and were the largest part of the U.S. commitment. The U.S. support provided fifty-nine helicopters: fourteen UH-60 Black Hawks, thirty single-engine UH-1H "Huey II" models, and fifteen twin-engine UH-1Ns. 8 Flight training of the Colombian Black Hawk pilots took place at Fort Rucker, Alabama. U.S. contractors trained the UH-1 pilots and crews in Colombia. A contract maintenance package was to keep the helicopters flying. Despite the enhanced mobility, a specially-trained counter-drug force was needed to fight on the ground.9 In 1999, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) commander, Marine General Charles Wilhelm, working in concert with the National Drug Policy Coordinator, retired Army General Barry McCaffrey, proposed that a Colombian Army unit be trained, equipped, and dedicated only to counter-drug operations. The 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) was to train the counter-drug battalion. The 900-man CD battalion had a headquarters company and three line infantry companies and was almost three times the size of a typical Colombian battalion. The new unit was designed to be highly mobile with organic helicopter support. The first CD battalion deemed operationally ready on 15 December 1999.10 At Fort Bragg, the 7th SFG assistant operations officer, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Solomon Delaney*, coordinated the movement of units and supplies from Fort Bragg to Columbia. Tied to U.S. funding were Congressional oversight and certain restrictions that added to the training burden for the 7th SFG. The six-month training program grew to nine months. Before training could begin, each Colombian soldier was vetted for possible human rights accusations, a problem in some parts of the Army vetting was similar to a criminal background check in the United States). Once the soldiers had been vetted by the State Department, three Special Forces companies (A/1/7th, A/3/7th, and A/2/7th respectively) rotated through the Tres Esquinas base to train the new battalion. A U.S. infantry battalion program of instruction stressed marksmanship and light infantry techniques. The unit, unlike other Colombian Army elements, was armed with U.S. equipment, including M16A2 rifles. The Gailil is the standard Colombian Army rifle.13 A programmed expansion of the

> counter-drug capability led to the fielding of two more CD battalions and the formation of a CD brigade headquarters for command and control in 2003. Congressional oversight constrained operations. The CD battalion and the U.S.-supplied helicopters could be used only for counter-drug operations and for emergency humanitarian activities—if NAS and the U.S. Embassy cleared requests. The CD unit could not be used to fight guerrillas even if the insurgents were supporting drug traffickers. This meant the soldiers and their organic helicopters were not available to assist conventional Colombian divisions on COIN operations. This situation changed after 11 September 2001. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States expanded the scope of U.S. involvement in Colombia from a strictly counter-drug mission to a combined strategy of counter narco-terrorism (CNT). The shift, caused by an "expanded authority," increased U.S. military involvement in the war on narcotics traffickers and terrorists.

"Plan Patriota was a military plan developed by the Government of Colombia with the financial support of the Government of the United States in an effort to uproot the guerrilla groups in Colombia, more specifically the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The plan is part of the government of President Alvaro Uribe's democratic security doctrine. The plan is also intended to get military presence to the most remote areas of Colombia, where the guerrillas had enclaves, and enable the introduction of social programs. Some analysts consider the plan to be a sort of second phase of Plan Colombia."

Some major key points of interest about the operations are below

"*As part of the operation, the Colombian units conduct extensive civic action and psychological operations to demonstrate the capacity of the government to look after the people.*

Highly trained Colombian National Police (CNP) Jungla units accompany the military in order to make arrests and secure evidence.

*I*n Phase 2, CNP Carabinero units are brought in the area to reestablish law and order. They build a fortified police station in case of a guerrilla counterattack and to actively establish their presence.

In Phase 3, additional assets, primarily public services, are added in order to consolidate the government control of the area. Once an area is secured, the Army moves the operation to another FARC-controlled sector.

Piece by piece the government retakes the FARC controlled areas. Throughout all phases, the Colombian military uses psychological operations. At the tactical level, each division and brigade has a Groupo Especial de Operaciones Sicológicas (GEOS—Psychological Operations Special Group) detachment assigned.Plan Colombia expired at the end of 2005.

The successes achieved by the plan were such that the U.S. Congress has continued funding at essentially the same level." (Jones, n.d.)

Prior to President Trumps second presidency some of the following operations were technically in effect. However, things are now full scale.

Current Border Operations

Operational Support

Service members providing motor transport operations support increase vehicle readiness rates. Military personnel dispatch vehicles, track preventative maintenance checks and services, and conduct light maintenance such as oil changes, tire changes, and battery replacements on CBP vehicles. DoD personnel may also operate heavy equipment such as forklifts, bulldozers, graders and front-end loaders to support sector/station loading and unloading of palletized shipments and infrastructure duties.

Detection and Monitoring Support

Service members supporting the CBP's detection and monitoring mission man and operate mobile surveillance camera (MSC) vehicles at strategically placed sites to observe and report suspicious activity to CBP. MSC operators are working in Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas along known corridors used by individuals illegally entering the United States. Military members are only utilized to detect and monitor movement of individuals suspected of preparing to enter the United States, or those who have already entered the United States without proper authority.

Crisis Response Force (CRF) Support

Service members supporting the CRF are capable of providing force protection, medical, aviation and engineering support anywhere along the border on short notice. The CRF is made up of an aviation unit, a military police unit, engineer unit, inherent medical capabilities, and associated support personnel for these units. The CRF is activated upon CBP request.

Air Support

DoD aviation support missions include tracking foot traffic signs, pickup/drop off of CBP agents in remote areas, monitoring for illicit activity, casualty evacuation, sling load capability, and transport of equipment as needed.

USNORTHCOM works closely with DHS and CBP to constantly assess support to CBP to ensure DoD has the right force, at the right time, in the right location to support CBP's operational needs.

Taken from NORTHCOM's FAQ page the following text answers common questions on the topic of border security and current operational outlook.

Q1. (U) What is USNORTHCOM's role as it relates to President Trump's Southern Border Security Executive Order?

Q1. (U) USNORTHCOM is DoD's operational lead for the employment of U.S. military forces to carry out President Trump's Executive Orders on protecting the territorial integrity of the United States. The command is being supported by relevant DOD Combatant Commanders, Military Departments, and the National Guard Bureau, all of which are working in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection to secure the border

Q2. (U) Is this part of the border mission currently conducted by USNORTHCOM?

A2. (U) The President's Executive Order directs a new and different mission. The initial surge of ~1,500 served to immediately increase the capacity of support to established CBP-support missions, but the size, composition, capabilities, and mission of the forces along the southern border will change.

Q3. (U) If DHS and CBP are the lead agencies for border security, why is the military needed?

A3. (U) USNORTHCOM has provided support at the southern border, through requests by DHS, for roughly 20 years. Our presence at the border is not new. However, USNORTHCOM has been directed by Executive Order to provide more support at the border, and that is what we're doing. A primary mission of USNORTHCOM is homeland defense, and the President has said the federal government must act with urgency and strength to end the threats posed by an unsecured border. We are aggressively carrying out the Command in Chief's orders to augment DHS and CBP efforts there to achieve full operational control of the southern border.

Q4. (U) Will more military troops be going to the border?

A4. (U) The initial number of military personnel recently sent to the southern border is about 1,600, and an additional 500 from 10th Mountain Division and 140 from the Joint Force will be joining the southern border mission. As we continue to enact the President's Executive Order, we anticipate additional personnel will be tasked for support in the future. It's too early to comment on what those are and what that looks like. The Department of Defense and USNORTHCOM is actively planning and assessing the situation to ensure we are postured to

meet all requirements and needs at the border. As planning continues to evolve, we will provide updates and information as necessary to keep the public informed.

Q5. (U) How long will active-duty members be sent to the southern border to support this mission?

A5. (U) The President's EO stipulates that efforts will be ongoing until complete operational control of the southern border is achieved.

(Source: USNORTHCOM)

Here is a list of the military units that are already at the US-Mexico border per Trump's orders. Their primary mission is deterrence. Deterrence from border breaches and from smuggling narcotics.

Active-duty Army units on the border mission:

- Headquarters, 89th Military Police Brigade, Fort Cavazos, Texas
- Headquarters, 720th Military Police Battalion, Fort Cavazos, Texas
- 401st Military Police Company, Fort Cavazos, Texas
- 202nd Military Police Company, Fort Bliss, Texas
- Headquarters, 716th Military Police Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky
- 23rd Military Police Company, Fort Drum, New York
- 549th Military Police Company, Fort Stewart, Georgia
- 530th Combat Engineer Company-Armored, Fort Stewart, Georgia
- 977th Military Police Company, Fort Riley, Kansas
- 41st Combat Engineer Company-Armored, Fort Riley, Kansas
- 569th Combat Engineer Company-Armored, Fort Carson, Colorado
- Headquarters, 759th Military Police Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado
- 66th Military Police Company, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington

Active-Duty Marine Corps units on the border mission:

- Detachment from 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California
- Detachment from 7th Engineer Support Battalion, 1st Marine Logistics Group, Camp Pendleton, California

Army units preparing to deploy include:

- 101st Division Sustainment Brigade, Fort Campbell, Kentucky
- Alpha Company, 189th Division Sustainment Support Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
- Bravo Company, 68th DSSB, Fort Carson, Colorado
- Charlie Company, 129th DSSB, Fort Campbell, Kentucky
- Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 264th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

- 70th Movement Control Team, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia
- 564th Quartermaster Company, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington

In all, about 1,140 additional military members will support the southern border mission.

Earlier this month, elements of Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York, were assigned to USNORTHCOM to support southern border efforts. About 500 members from 10th Mountain Division arrived at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to constitute a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

(USNORTHCOM)


LAND FORCES
HEAVY FORCES
MEDIUM FORCES
LIGHT FORCES
LIGHT FORCES
are forces optimized for dismounted operations and operations in close terrain and specific environments.
MOUNTAIN FORCES are LIGHT FORCES
classified based on mountainous terrain in which they operate or means of deployment.
Mountain troops have specialized capabilities, equipment scales and training to allow them to operate in mountainous terrain.
The characteristics of these specialist capability forces are designed to operate effectively in specific mountainous terrain in all weather conditions.
Ref ATP-3.2.1 ALLIED LAND TACTICS Ed B Ver 1 2018

The Air Force -- with a major assist from the Coast Guard -- was also playing a role in the border operation, with C-17 Globemaster III and C-130 Hercules aircraft participating in repatriation flights, meaning they are flying undocumented migrants back to their countries of origin. However, the Air Force has declined to specify which units are involved, unlike the other services.

"The 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Area of Responsibility (AOR) includes the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico; the waters adjacent to Central America and South. America;

the Caribbean Sea, its 13 island nations, European and U.S. territories; the Gulf of Mexico; and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. It encompasses 32 countries (19 in Central and South America and 13 in the Caribbean) and covers about 15.6 million square miles. The region represents about one-sixth of the landmass of the world assigned to regional unified commands. The 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) also supports the missions in Iraq". ("7th SFG (a) History," n.d.)


© P-E / Militariabelgium
7th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 7th Special Forces Group
Group Support Company, 7th Special Forces Group
1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group
Batta ion HHD, 1st Btn, 7th SFG
Batta ion Support Company, 1st Btn, 7th SFG
Alpha Company, 1st Btn, 7th SFG
Bravo Company, 1st Btn, /th SFG
Charl e Company, 1st Btn, 7th SFG
2nd Battal:on, 7th Special Forces Group
Batta ion HHD, 2nd Btn, 7th SFG
Batta ion Support Company, 2nd Btn, 7th SFG
Alpha Company, 2nd Btn, 7th SFG
Bravo Company, 2nd Btn, /th SFG
Charl e Company, 2nd Btn, 7th SFG
3rd Battalion 7th Special Forces Group
Battalion HHD, 3rd Btn, 7th SFG
Battalion Support Company, 3rd Btn, 7th SFG
Alpha Company, 3rd Btn, 7th SFG
Bravo Company, 3rd Btn, /th SFG
Charlie Company, 3rd Btn, 7th SFG
4th Battalion 7th Special Forces Group
Battalion HHD, 4th Btn, 7th SFG
Btn Sup Co, 4th Btn, 7th SFG
Alpha Company, 4th Btn, 7th SFG
Bravo Company, 4th Btn, /th SFG
Charlie Company, 4th Btn, 7th SFG
The 4th Battalion, 7th Special Forces Gro..p (Airborne), is not already activatec but will be on sept, 2011

It should be noted that approximately eleven people plus the SF commander or one SFOD are being deployed on this mission to train the Mexican Navy's "Infantería de Marina" (marine infantry) on conventional and non-conventional types of combat tactics.The training will occur from February. 17th through March 30th, 2025. It will commence at Luis Carpizo Naval facility in the state of Campeche.

'An ODA consists of 12 soldiers, each of whom has a specific function (MOS or Military Occupational Specialty) on the team; however, all members of an ODA conduct cross-training. The ODA is led by an 18A (Detachment Commander), a captain, and a 180A (Assistant Detachment Commander) who is their second in command, usually a Warrant Officer One or Chief Warrant Officer Two. The team also includes the following enlisted soldiers: one 18Z (Operations Sergeant) (known as the "Team Sergeant"), usually a Master Sergeant, one 18F (Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant), usually a Sergeant First Class, and two each, 18Bs (Weapons Sergeant), 18Cs (Engineer Sergeant), 18Ds (Medical Sergeant), and 18Es (Communications Sergeant), usually Sergeants First Class, Staff Sergeants, or Sergeants. This organization facilitates 6-man "split team" operations, redundancy, and mentoring between a senior NCO and their junior assistant.

Special Forces ODA Team Structure (Operational Detachments Alpha)

POSITION	RANK	GRADE	MOS
Detachment Commander - CO	Captain / Major	O3/04	18A
Executive Officer - XO	Warrant Officer	WO1-4	180A
Team Sergeant / Ops NCO	Master Sergeant	E-8	18Z
Intelligence & Operations NCO	Sergeant First Class	E-7	18F
Weapons Sergeant	Sergeant First Class	E-7	18B
Assistant Weapons Sergeant	Staff Sergeant	E-6	18B
Engineer Sergeant	Sergeant First Class	E-7	18C
Assistant Engineer Sergeant	Staff Sergeant	E-6	18C
Medical Sergeant	Sergeant First Class	E-7	18D

Assistant Medical Sergeant	Staff Sergeant	E-6	18D
Communications Sergeant	Sergeant First Class	E-7	18E
Assistant Communications	Staff Sergeant	E-6	18E

Source: ("SF-ODA 'the a Team' - Army Special Forces: The Green Berets - Gunnery Network SOF," n.d.)

"A Special Forces group is historically assigned to a Unified Combatant Command or a theater of operations. The Special Forces Operational Detachment C or C-detachment (SFODC) is responsible for a theater or a major subcomponent, which can provide command and control of up to 18 SFODAs, three SFODB, or a mixture of the two. Subordinate to it is the Special Forces Operational Detachment Bs or B-detachments (SFODB), which can provide command and control for six SFODAs. Further subordinate, the SFODAs typically raise company- to battalion-sized units when on unconventional warfare missions. They can form six-man "split A" detachments that are often used for special reconnaissance (SR).

Basic Element – SF Operational Detachment-A (SFODA) composition

A Special Forces company normally consists of six Operational Detachments-A (ODA or "A-Teams"). Each ODA specializes in an infiltration skill or a particular mission-set (e.g. military free fall (HALO), combat diving, mountain warfare, maritime operations, etc.). Each ODA Team's number is unique. Prior to 2007, the number typically consisted of three digits, reflecting the Group, the specific ODB within the battalion, and the specific ODA within the company.[54] Starting in 2007, the number sequence was changed to a four-digit format. The first digit would specify group (1=1st SFG, 3=3rd SFG, 5=5th SF, 7=7th SFG, 0=10th SFG, 9=19th SFG, 2=20th SFG). The second digit would be 1-4 for 1st through 4th Battalion. The third digit would be 1-3 for A to C Companies. The fourth digit would be 1-6 for the particular team within that company. For example, ODA 1234 would signify the fourth ODA in Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group.

Battalion Headquarters Element – SF Operational Detachment-C (SFODC) composition

The SFODC, or "C-Team", is the headquarters element of a Special Forces battalion. As such, it is a command and control unit with operations, training, signals, and logistic support responsibilities to its three subordinate line companies. A lieutenant colonel commands the battalion as well as the C-Team, and the Battalion Command Sergeant Major is the senior NCO of the battalion and the C-Team. There are an additional 20–30 SF personnel who fill key positions in operations, logistics, intelligence, communications, and medical. A Special Forces battalion usually consists of four companies: "A", "B", "C", and Headquarters/Support.[53][54]

The ODB, or "B-Team", is the headquarters element of a Special Forces company, and it is usually composed of 11–13 soldiers. While the A-team typically conducts direct operations, the

purpose of the B-Team is to support the company's A-Teams both in garrison and in the field.[citation needed] The B-Teams are numbered similarly to A-Teams (see below), but the fourth number in the sequence is a 0. For example, ODB 5210 would be 5th Special Forces Group, 2nd Battalion, A Company's ODB.

The ODB is led by an 18A, usually a major, who is the company commander (CO). The CO is assisted by his company executive officer (XO), another 18A, usually a captain. The XO is himself assisted by a company technician, a 180A, generally, a chief warrant officer three, who assists in the direction of the organization, training, intelligence, counter-intelligence, and operations for the company and its detachments. The company commander is assisted by a senior non-commissioned officer, an 18Z, usually a sergeant major. A second 18Z acts as the operations sergeant, usually a master sergeant, who assists the XO and technician in their operational duties. He has an 18F assistant operations sergeant, who is usually a sergeant first class. The company's support comes from an 18D medical sergeant, usually a sergeant first class, and two 18E communications sergeants, usually a sergeant first class and a staff sergeant.

Support positions as part of the ODB/B Team within an SF Company are as follows:

- The supply NCO, usually a Staff Sergeant, the commander's principal logistical planner, works with the battalion S-4 to supply the company.
- The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN defense) NCO, usually a Sergeant, maintains and operates the company's NBC detection and decontamination equipment, and assists in administering NBC defensive measures.
- Other jobs can also exist depending on the B-Team structure. Specialist team members can include I.T. (S-6) personnel, and Military Intelligence Soldiers, including Intelligence Analysts (35F), Human Intelligence Collectors (35M), Signals Intelligence (35 N/P - also

known as SOT-A and SOT-B as related to their positions on SFODA and SFODB teams), Intelligence Officers (35 D/E/F), and Counterintelligence Special Agents (35L/351L).

The US Special Operations Forces are a direct byproduct of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and British Special Operations Executive (SOE). These units date back to WW2 where they clandestinely and covertly carried out risky sabotage missions, guerrilla warfare, and resistance support in Europe. The Jedburghs are what they were known as. Today they are known as SOF, Special Forces or Green Berets. We have several other special operations units, actually at least one per each military branch. Many of these units like the Navy SEALS (NSW) and Coast Guard will surely be called to service. providing aid in international drug interdiction efforts and missions within maritime setting . The CCP controls at least two, maybe three major shipping ports in Mexico. This allows for easy bypass of security controls and protocol. For instance we know that the CCP Of all these units I firmly believe the Ranger Battalion and Special Forces could accomplish this mission, but only when coupled with a robust logistical, information superiority and truly all source intelligence capability.

The United States (U.S.) Army Special Forces (SF) represent the premier Department of Defense (DOD) force designed to conduct special warfare, direct action (DA), counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), foreign Internal Defense (FID) and village stability (VS). SF Soldiers are specifically selected, trained, and educated to shape foreign policy. Coupled with the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), defense intelligence agency (DIA), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Department of State(DOS), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), National Geospatial Agency (NGA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) assets to bear,, acting as the “Inter-Agency” no task is too big. With one mission in mind, protect and secure America, I have no doubt that this task can be achieved. Unfortunately we may have to involve two organizations that became political

and weaponized by the Biden Administration this last four years, DHS and FBI. Perhaps they can just hand over their databases and files to DIA and let them sort out what type of targeting data we need.

Unique features of the Special Forces Branch

"a. Unique purpose of the Special Forces Branch. The United States (U.S.) Army Special Forces (SF) represent the premier Department of Defense (DOD) force designed to conduct special warfare. SF Soldiers are specifically selected, trained, and educated to shape foreign political and military environments by working with and through host nations (HNs), regional partners, and indigenous populations. SF provides the United States with a small footprint option for influencing unfriendly regimes, addressing insurgencies, and containing conflicts that could destabilize U.S. allies and partners. To accomplish these missions, SF possess qualities and capabilities to mix non lethal and lethal activities designed to shape the environment, deter conflict, prevail in war, or successfully conduct a wide range of contingency operations. Ultimately, SF is designed and trained to understand the balance between diplomacy and force, and is most applicable for creating the conditions for a favorable conflict resolution. This judgment has been honed over decades of engagement with allies, coalition partners, and indigenous populations and provides the United States a discreet, low-signature, small-footprint alternative to a JTF or other large military force structure."(Special Forces Branch 2019)

"The hallmark of SF is the delivery of strategic value to the nation through an indigenous approach to operations, precision targeting, local understanding and influence,and crisis response. SF are employed throughout the operational spectrum and across all campaign phases, including interagency or coalition led operations. SF capabilities represent inherent

scalable mission command nodes and force packages that are low-signature, employ a small footprint, and are particularly suited for employment in politically sensitive environments. As representatives of the US in foreign countries, SF Soldiers are language trained, culturally astute, and regionally oriented. Often serving as trainers and advisors, they interact closely with and live under the same conditions as the indigenous forces they partner with in war, SF provide unique combined, joint, or unilateral capabilities to the combatant commander. In peacetime, they conduct operations and promote regional stability in areas where other forces normally do not operate."

Their continuous forward presence assists in creating the conditions necessary for long term stable environments, thereby reducing the risk of armed conflict. As such, SF operations are inherently Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) - focused toward achieving operational and strategic level effects. (Special Forces Branch 2019)

c. Two core competencies of SF are unconventional warfare (UW) and foreign internal defense (FID), which can be considered conceptual opposites. In UW, SF work through resistance movements to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow unfriendly governments (or occupying powers) through a wide combination of low-visibility direct and indirect activities in denied areas. (JFKSW Center and School) (U.S.) (Special Forces Branch 2019)

An especially important task of the Army that is commonly overlooked by others in "military operations other than war", will be Civil Affairs operations. Civil Affairs (CA) will be one of the first assets deployed. (Special Forces Branch 2019)

OTHER NONORGANIC SUPPORT

"A working relationship between the supporting CA unit and the SF S2 aids the commander's mission planning preparation, and execution. A good relationship ensures information passes quickly between the two elements and eliminates duplicated effort."

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT

CA forces are essential to the success of all missions that occur near, among, or with civilian populations, governments, or inter-organizational partners. Underpinning all CA capabilities is a comprehensive sociocultural understanding of the operating environment. Special operations Civil Affairs forces conduct preparation of the environment, support to unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and civil network development and engagement (CNDE) across the

competition continuum. CNDE is the process by which Civil Affairs forces engage, evaluate, develop, and integrate civil networks and their capabilities into operations. Cultural orientation, regional expertise, linguistic capabilities, advisory skills, and civil network development expertise distinguish CA forces from other entities on the battlefield. In the cross functional team model, SOF CA may take the lead during cooperation and post-conflict consolidation of gains.'

'CNDE is key to support both PO and SF. Through CNDE, CA can assist PO counterparts through targeting of influence activities and provide access to populations for information delivery during UW, FID, or PE. CA further enables MISO by identifying civil partners for establishing influence networks and coordinating projects in support of shaping perceptions and behavior, then assessing the effects of those efforts.'

CA support to Special Forces stems heavily from CNDE. For SF, CA provides multiple inputs into the targeting cycle for both kinetic and non-kinetic effects. CA can recommend targets for SF engagement, including direct action, by providing information and analysis on friendly and

adversary centers of gravity, decisive points, and critical links and nodes within the civil component of the operating environment. CA can mitigate undesirable second- and third-order effects by populating no-strike/restricted target lists with politically or culturally sensitive sites. CA may also provide SF with access and placement for target engagement.

"In daily operations, CA personnel deal with people, equipment, and documentary material that may provide valuable intelligence. This is important since many SF missions depend upon the support of the civilian population. UW and FID missions can fail without popular support. That is why SF commanders must consider the impact of all of their activities on the civilian population.

In support of SF mission planning, preparation, and execution, CA elements--

- Train and advise members of the supported SF unit in civil military operations (CMO) and the political, economic, social, and cultural factors that influence SF operations.
- Identify and acquire foreign resources.
- Coordinate with other agencies to minimize civilian interference.
- Assist in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population, families of supported indigenous forces, and persons displaced by SF operations.
- Supplement the intelligence effort by collecting information during CMO.
- Act as staff focal point for cultural aspects that affect SF operations.
- Coordinate and integrate CA activities with PSYOP activities.
- Provide technical advice and assistance on civil assistance, military civic action, and humanitarian assistance programs.
- Provide input during pre-mission planning and preparation. This minimizes civilian interference and reduces collateral damage to the civilian populace and economy.

PSYOP Support

"PSYOP are particularly important to SF. PSYOP units can provide SF intelligence personnel with key information concerning influential population segments, vulnerabilities of hostile groups, and other information that adds to the overall intelligence effort in the operational area. The earlier a close working relationship is established between the SF unit and the supporting PSYOP unit, the greater the chances of mission success.

SF PSYOP elements--

- Provide advice and assist SF units as they work to obtain and sustain the support of neutral and uncommitted segments of a foreign power.
- Exploit hostile vulnerabilities in the operational area.
- Design PSYOP for deployed SF teams to execute.
- Recommend and plan actions like civil disobedience, rallies, and demonstrations that degrade or neutralize hostile influences on the target audiences.
- Review SF plans to identify potentially adverse effects on target audiences that could affect mission accomplishment.
- Train SF soldiers in the customs they must honor in the operational area.
- Provide basic and special PSYOP assessments that add to the overall intelligence effort in the operational area.
- Advise SF commanders and their staffs on the psychological impact of military operations on target audiences within the operational area." (Pike, n.d.)

SF Support to IEW

"By using SR in denied areas, SF can provide the IEW system with human eyes on the objective. SR operations encompass a broad range of intelligence collection activities to include reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. The SR collection effort emphasizes US unilateral (or alliance) intelligence requirements, not the requirements of an indigenous resistance organization. SR complements national and theater collection systems (such as high altitude imagery or SIGINT) that are more vulnerable to weather, terrain, masking, and hostile countermeasures. SR operations can be broken into two categories:Battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance, which involves the use of standard patrolling tactics and techniques. Such missions are often for extended durations beyond or in the absence of conventional fire support and sustainment means."(Pike, n.d.)

Clandestine collection, which is complex and sensitive, involves the SIGINT and HUMINT techniques normally reserved to the US intelligence community. SF teams may conduct unilateral clandestine collection missions in crisis situations, in support of national and theater CT forces, or in other conditions short of war. In wartime or as a special activity, SF teams may conduct unilateral clandestine collection missions in hostile areas where the threat precludes the use of other HUMINT means. Clandestine collection may require oversight, interagency coordination, and control of SF teams by the US intelligence community.

Typical SR missions include--

- Initial contact with an indigenous resistance organization and assessment of resistance potential.
- Collection of strategic, political, economic, psychological, or military information.
- Collection of critical military OB information (for example, NBC capabilities and intentions, commitment of second-echelon forces, and location of high-level headquarters).

- Collection of technical military information.
- Target acquisition and surveillance of hostile C^2 systems, troop concentrations, deep strike weapons, LOC, and other military targets of strategic or operational significance.
- Location and surveillance of hostage, PW, or political prisoner detention facilities.
- Post Strike reconnaissance.
- Meteorologic, geographic, or hydrographic reconnaissance to support specific aerospace, land, or maritime operations" (Pike, n.d.)

The conduct of SR should be viewed against the backdrop of current military challenges and the complex comprehensive battlespace of the 21st century. As a consequence,

SOF's ability to conduct SR may be limited by legal or sovereign constraints or restraints, especially when collecting against peer adversaries within NATO or enemy sovereign territory. Within this context, SOF SR operations fulfil the criteria of strategic- or operational-level effects being delivered by small, flexible units employing specialized equipment, skills, and tactics within an uncertain, hostile, or politically sensitive environment.

SR actions provide an additive capability for commanders at all levels and supplements the collection efforts of wider conventional forces.

- Supports national and theatre-collection efforts by obtaining specific, well-defined, and possibly time-sensitive information of strategic or operational value.

- Can complement other collections methods limited by weather, terrain, systems limits, or hostile countermeasures to support environmental analysis, target system analysis, or target audience analysis.
- May use specialized equipment, skills, and tactics within an uncertain, hostile, or politically sensitive environment.
- Supports the post-action assessment of the application of military force and the delivery of planned effects.

The first mission set will likely be Military Assistance (MA)

MA provides the ideal opportunity for SOF to support the US Comprehensive Approach to operations. This requires SOF to understand fully the environment that they are operating in and to deliver the lethal and non-lethal effects required to facilitate the comprehensive nature of activity between military and non-military actors across the instruments of power. MA spans the spectrum of conflict and must be enduring to be effective. The range of the MA activities is considerable and may include:

- Training designated individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, maritime, and air skill; provide assistance to designated leaders; and provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures
- Advising the performance of designated actors by providing expertise to designated levels of command; facilitating and influencing the improvement of friendly forces through the creation of professional relationships; and observing, evaluating, and reporting on the performance of friendly forces
- Mentoring conducted by teams of subject matter experts who work closely with designated personnel and provide direction and guidance to support development and growth of personnel and organizations

- Partnering conducted by
- subject matter experts who are tasked to work closely with personnel and organizations to develop appropriate capabilities that are interoperable with NATO forces and structures
- Interagency support that establishes critical relationships to support friendly force agencies and facilitate comprehensive action between military and non-military actors across the instruments of power.

SF PRINCIPAL TASKS.

"(1) UW is defined as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area (JP 3-05, Special Operations). The inherently interagency, multinational, and widely dispersed activities of UW are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in denied areas to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow oppressive regimes. The demands of UW missions require mature SF Soldiers who are adept at interacting with a wide range of factors and agencies capable of, and trusted with, sensitive and largely independent operations.

(2) FID is defined as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense). SF provides an experienced and mature military advisory capability that assists allies and partner nations to develop regional stability, enhance global security, and facilitate future operations over the long term, SF persistent engagement with HNs,

regional partners, indigenous populations, and their institutions through FID activities help set conditions for best possible outcomes.

(3) Security Force Assistance (SFA) is defined as DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government (USG) to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3- 22). FID and SFA are both subsets of security cooperation; neither is considered a subset of each other. SFA also prepares Foreign Security Forces (FSF) to defend against external threats and to perform as a part of an international coalition as well.

(4) Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency (JP3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations).

(5) Direct Action (DA) is defined as short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically- sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture,bexploit, recover, or damage designated targets (JP 3-05, Special Operations). DA differs from conventional offensive operations in the level of risk, techniques employed, and the degree of precision utilized to create a specific effect. It usually incorporates a planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area.

DA is focused on specific, well-defined targets of strategic- and operational-level significance and can be conducted independently, with support from, or in support of conventional forces.

DA is the signature activity of SOF due to the type of Army operations conducted over the last 20 years in what has been a largely non- permissive environment where SOF has lacked freedom of manoeuvre and tactical advantage. However, operations against peer adversaries

present a different challenge where the opportunity to conduct DA may be markedly reduced in comparison to recent operations. Therefore, for future operations, SOF DA actions should be viewed as on a par with both MA and SR activities rather than being at the forefront of SOF operations.

DA activities may include:

- Raids, ambushes, and direct assaults to engage specific, well-defined, and often time critical targets in support of strategic- and operational-level objectives which may be beyond the effective strike capabilities of conventional forces
- Terminal guidance operations to identify and report the precise location of targets and to allow non-organic stand-off platforms to use their weapons to effectively engage
- Recovery operations to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to Alliance security from non-permissive or hostile environments
- Precision destruction operations where the avoidance of collateral damage is directed as an operational objective in addition to and the destruction of the target. These operations may be conducted against targets where precision-guided munitions cannot guarantee first strike success or where the contents of a facility must be destroyed without damage to the facility.

DA activities can be employed within any environment; however, the political and military risk associated with SOF DA activities changes depending upon the operating environment.

The maritime environment, due to military, economic, and political pressures, has re-emerged as a significant domain of interest, contention, and utility to both SOF and its adversaries.

(6) Special Reconnaissance (SR) is defined as reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces (JP 3-05). The range of SR activities is considerable and may include:

- Environmental reconnaissance to collect and report critical aspects of the environment, including hydrographical, geological, geographical, meteorological, and oceanographic information
- Threat assessment to support the different levels of command in determining which elements of an adversary force pose a threat to friendly operations; what are the adversary's capabilities for mounting an attack; the likely methods to be employed; and which friendly forces are most vulnerable to attack. This can include the longer term observation to complete target system analysis or target audience analysis.
- Target assessment to detect, identify, locate, track, and assess a target to determine the most effective application of military action to produce the desired effects
- Post-action reconnaissance to gather information for battle damage assessment and operations assessment to measure the results of the application of military force

(7) Counter terrorism (CT) is defined as actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global environments inhospitable to terrorist networks (JP 3-26, Counterterrorism).

(8) Counter proliferation (CP) is action taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S., our forces, allies, and partners (JP 3- 40), Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction). Special Forces Operational Detachments (SFODs) designated in national

and theater contingency plans to participate in CP may be specially task-organized, trained, and equipped.

(9) Information Operations (IO) are defined as the integrated employment of the core Special Forces Branch - 26 August 2019 capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with the specified supporting and related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own (JP 3-13, Information Operations).

(10) Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. MISO activities are designed to strengthen partnerships and to counter global and regional threats, consistent with mutual Partner Nation (PN) and U.S. security strategies and objectives. MISO forces work in conjunction with PNs' security forces in the region, and use a variety of means to enable USSOUTHCOM to attain Commander's Campaign Plan objectives and to influence select foreign audiences in accordance with desired attitudes and behavior. These means include, but are not limited to, public engagements, terrestrial and satellite television, radio, print products, text messages, social media and websites. These MISO activities are coordinated with U.S. government agencies and implemented in accordance with U.S. Code and DoD policies. USSOUTHCOM is also working with its partners in Colombia, Peru, and Panama to offer and pay rewards for information that enables the disruption of terrorist threats or contributes to the force protection of U.S. and PN security forces. I'm curious how this type of operation will work in a Mexico Theatre of operations.

" (Special Forces Branch 2019)

MORE US GROUND FORCES-INTELLIGENCE/SF=EW

"Future forward deployed SF Units will require vast and significant Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare capabilities to run and support current and future operations within Mexico. Each region and zone of Mexico holds its own level of cartel control and territory activity that requires application of proper military operations process. One region may require, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), another may require Counterterrorism Operations (CT), and another may require kinetic unconventional warfare (UW) like Direct Action (DA). Applying the proper solution to each geographic region and zone is a necessary predicate to success."

"Organic IEW support is essential to successful infiltration, exfiltration, survival, and mission execution of operational units in various hostile environments. The SF commander requires organic IEW support with commensurate analysis, collection management, security, weather, and communications capabilities tailored to supported regional command requirements across the operational continuum.

Intelligence assets organic to SF are organized according to operational and analytical needs. IEW assets are located at the group, battalion, company, and operational detachment-A (ODA) levels. Each intelligence asset has its own missions, functions, and limitations.

The SF detachment intelligence staffs and MI detachments are the key components of the organic IEW team. The SF staff plans, organizes, directs, coordinates, and controls while the MI

detachment commander executes the directives. The SF MI detachment is led by the detachment commander who gives the team leadership, motivation, focused perspective, and direction. (Pike, n.d.)

GROUP S2

The group S2 is the principal staff officer for all intelligence and security matters. Based on the commander's requirements, he develops intelligence collection missions and tasks subordinate elements, including organic and supporting MI units.

A group S2 section generally consists of an S2, assistant S2, SSO, SF technician, senior NCO, and additional NCOs for operations, intelligence, C-SIGINT, imagery analysis, and intelligence analysis.

The group S2--

- Directs the group collection effort, tasking appropriate organic and attached assets and forwarding RIIs to higher headquarters.

- Supervises the group information, ADP, and personnel security programs.

- Advises the commander in the employment of SF unit intelligence assets.

- Provides intelligence support to OPSEC, EW operations, and deception planning.

- Exercises staff supervision over the unit's MI detachment.

- Coordinates CI activities in support of operational requirements.

- Coordinates and manages the group intelligence training program.

- Exercises staff supervision over the special staff functions of the USAF SO weather team when a weather team is attached.

- Identifies, validates, and coordinates priorities for unit geographic area requirements for MC&G products to support OPLANs and CONPLANs, and monitors and validates map requisitions.

- Requests topographic support through command channels for specific AIs. This support may include tailored terrain products, terrain studies, and over-printed MC&G products and services.

- Provides integrated all-source intelligence collection management, analysis, production, and dissemination in support of group level situation and target development. This includes DS to the ODAs.

- Establishes and operates a tactical or field SCIF in the SFOB OPCEN.

- Provides SCI communications between the SFOB and the deployed forward operations bases (FOBS)

GROUP MI DETACHMENT



Figure 2. New Structure of the Military Intelligence Company

The group MI detachment provides integrated all-source intelligence collection management, analysis, production, and dissemination in support of group level situations and target development. These functions correspond to, but are much broader than, those performed by the tactical operations center (TOC) support element of a conventional MI unit.

The detachment establishes and operates a tactical SCIF in the SFOB OPCEN and provides SCI communications between the SFOB and the deployed FOBs. It provides interrogation and CI support. (Pike, n.d.)

The detachment commander may work for the deputy group commander under the staff supervision of the group S2. When the detachment is formally detached from the support company, the detachment commander exercises normal company level command, but the detachment remains dependent on the support company for administrative and logistical support. Figure 4-1 shows this structure. (Pike, n.d.)

Once all assets are operational ,we can then set the operational environment (OE) leveraging Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PsyOps) with an intended goal or outcome of controlling the information environment (IE). “Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) is a DOD term for a category of traditional military activities conducted in anticipation of, in preparation for, and to facilitate follow-on military operations. It is a term DOD frequently uses, though its definition does not exist in statute. The DOD defines OPE as the “conduct of activities in likely or potential operational areas to set conditions for mission execution,” with the operational environment defined as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”

Examples of OPE could include close-in reconnaissance of a target, infrastructure development in a targeted area, or the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of forces in an anticipated area of operations. (Pike, n.d.)

ALL intelligence assets and sources need to be called into play at all levels and from ALL agencies that have sources, having FTO target profiles pre-built out, identified, prioritized and refined. At this point field assets and their reporting, within each operational region, should have already been collected and processed. All signals intelligence should be analyzed and disseminated. This will require robust intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance employing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAS) to surveil and collect, in addition to a needed headquarters (HQ) for intel operations. SF has the unique capabilities to stand up their own Company headquarters .

Additional assets

"The SF group commander exercises C^2 through a network of operational bases. These operational bases combine the functions of the CP and unit trains into a single entity. They are normally located at secure and logistically supportable sites in the communications zone (COMMZ). The SFOB is a command, control and support base established and operated by an SF group from organic and attached resources. FOBs are also command, control, and support bases but they are established by the SF battalion.

Each SF group and battalion commander normally organizes the SFOB or FOB into an OPCEN, a support center (SPTCEN), and a signal center (SIGCEN). All three centers have their own

organization and functions but their activities are interdependent. Figure 4-3 shows this structure. (FM 31-20, Chapter 6, discusses the OPCEN, SPTCEN, and SIGCEN in detail.)"



Figure 4-3. A type of SF operational base.

HOST NATION OPERATIONS–

Stabilization is an approach used to mitigate crises, promote legitimate political authority and set the conditions for long/term stability by using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security, and end social, economic, and political turmoil.

Breakdown in Security

- Widespread Organised Crime;
- Failure of HN Security Institutions;
- Rise of malign actors;
- Risk of state failure.

Economic Collapse

- Destruction of infrastructure;
- Rise of black market and inhability of government to collect revenue;
- Rising unemployment and dependence on aid;
- Increased potential for humanitarian crises;
- Vulnerability to shock.

Failure of State Institutions

- Loss of Government monopoly on legitimate use of violence;
- Endemic corruption in formal and informal governance;
- Arbitrary application of justice.

Peace Support

Humanitarian Assistance

Counterinsurgency

- Major Combat Operations

S&R provides an overarching concept for stabilizing unstable states. This is primarily achieved by addressing the sources of instability. Consequently, S&R activities may be components of other operations. In some cases S&R will overlap with activities of other operations, such as peace support and counterinsurgency (COIN).

Peace support is defined as the efforts conducted impartially to restore and maintain peace.

Humanitarian assistance are all the activities that as primary purpose save lives and alleviate suffering of a crises affected population.

COIN operations have the aim of defeating an insurgency, it can overlap S&R but it can also be conducted separately both operations have the aim of increasing HN ability and fostering its legitimacy.

But also during Major combat operations, in particular S&R following this kind of operations needs to be planned using an integrated approach in order to understand the relationship between elites, states and populations.

One of the mainstays of US SF is their unique ability to work **BY, With, and Through** their allied, partner, indigenous, or host nation counterparts. This is another imperative since we will be assisting Mexico in their own efforts to stop cartel operations. It will remain Mexico's responsibility to use civilian police and military police to maintain civil order and promote humanitarian assistance efforts. There will also be hundreds if not more of Non-Governmental

Organizations (NGO's) helping with humanitarian assistance. The main issue will be restoring the public's trust in the civil authorities.

Assuming that the battlefield landscape has already gone through at least the first round intelligence process of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Targeting packages have likely been built out and should be getting refined in nature . From my estimate this will be a "Limited War" in scope & nature. Using SOF and what is referred to as the Afghanistan Model of warfare (AF), whereas we leverage air superiority with SOF ground forces to accomplish our mission objectives. This methodology, aside from Afghanistan, was used in Iraq and Libya in 2011.

After looking at what's taken place, China, effectively utilizing the Mexican FTO's as a proxy force, in the form of asymmetric warfare, is something we failed to anticipate or we would have thwarted their efforts earlier. We need to re-establish the initiative, this is no longer a civilian law enforcement issue. There has been a great convergence of Civilian and Military roles pertaining to the cartels who clearly outgun Mexican authorities and in some cases the Mexican Military. However, for the most part the Mexican Military, given more training, is fully capable of overwhelming its cartel rivals via firepower, tactics and manpower when given all the correct circumstances, including surprise and violence of action. Some of the regular missions of the MX Military include.

1. Drug interdiction and anti-trafficking initiatives.
2. Disaster response and recovery efforts.
3. Border security and immigration control.

Among Mexico's specialized units are the Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFES), which operate within the Special Forces. Their training allows them to handle counter-terrorism,

reconnaissance, and hostage rescue missions. The Mexican Army also boasts elite counter-narcotics units formed to address drug trafficking and organized crime, crucial issues facing national security. (Wiki, n.d.)

Additionally, the Mexican Army has specialized medical units that ensure soldiers receive immediate healthcare during and after operations. Technical support units focused on cyber-warfare and intelligence gathering have also emerged, highlighting the Army's adaptation to modern warfare challenges.

These specialized units within the Mexican Army are vital for maintaining operational readiness and responding to various security threats. Their distinct roles are essential to ensuring a comprehensive approach to national defense and contributing to the overall structure of the Mexican Armed Forces. (Editorial Team 2024)

México is divided into twelve Military Regions composed of forty-four subordinate Military Zones [the 2007 ed. of the IISS lists 12 regions, 45 zones]. Operational needs determine how many zones are in each region, with corresponding increases and decreases in troop strength.

Usually on the secretary of defence's recommendation, the senior zone commander is also the commander of the military region containing the military zone. A military zone commander has jurisdiction over every unit operating in his territory, including the *Rurales* (Rural Defense Force) that occasionally have been a Federal political counterweight to the power of state governors. Zone commanders provide the national defence secretary with socio-political conditions and intelligence about rural areas. Moreover, they traditionally have acted in coordination with the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) on planning and resources deployment. (Wiki, n.d.)

> "The Mexican army has six brigades: one armored, two infantry, one motorized infantry, one airborne, and the Presidential Guard Brigade - the latter includes a reaction group,

> (*grupo de reaccion inmediata y potente*, G.R.I.P.), whose members are trained in martial arts such as karate,jiu jitsu, tae kwon do, kickboxing, kung fu, judo, and silat; furthermore, they are trained in techniques and tactics in order to protect high-ranking officials and civil servants, such as the President. "

The Army has a Special Forces Corps unified command with 3 Special Forces Brigades, a High Command GAFE group, a GAFE group assigned to the Airborne Brigade and several Amphibious Special Forces Groups.

The Special Forces Brigades consist of nine SF battalions. The 1st Brigade has the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions; the 2nd Brigade has the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Battalions; and the 3rd Brigade has the 4th and 9th Battalions and a Rapid Intervention Force group.

The High Command GAFE is a group with no more than 100 members and is specially trained in counter-terrorist tactics. They receive orders directly from the President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto. The Amphibious Special Forces Groups are trained in amphibious warfare, they give the army extended force to the coastal lines. (Editorial Team 2024) (Wiki, n.d.)

In order for any of this methodology to work properly we must first identify the persons and institutions in key positions that can be fully or even partially trusted in order to leverage diplomatic affairs. Key Leader engagement at this juncture is crucial. Currently we have several key cartel figure heads in US custody. We have El CHapo Guzman, one of the heads of Sinaloa (CDS). We now have in custody "El Mencho de Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Once these key players and other heads such as President Shienbaum, state Governors, state Senators, head military leaders (zone commanders) and most consequently, town Mayors, which are critical, then real negotiations can take place with the United States. There will likely be betrayals, backstabbing and more bloodshed before negotiations are fully settled. In my opinion there should be a new cartel FEDERATION created similar to the old defunct and

disbanded one that existed before, promoting consistency and peace before corruption, greed, war and mass death.

Initial background screening and continuous vetting and evaluation of each key player is also an operational imperative. We simply can't have information leaks (OPSEC) about anything related to planning, operations, intelligence, military assets or future actions occurring.

I was happy to hear about a recently reported "possible" airspace incursion that occurred in MX, whereas, a US spy plane made several passes over certain Mexican regions in the Baja area. The type of aircraft identified was a US Air Force RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft, which was seen departing Nebraska, Offutt Air Force Base on Monday the 17th via the FlightRadar APP, which, after research, I found is especially outfitted to collect overhead signals intelligence. The collection apparatus essentially "scoops" up data as it passes by overhead. CDS is known to be operating in the areas flown during these sorties. President Shienbaum has authorized these intelligence and reconnaissance flights since Biden was in office. The US Air Force has 17 Rivet Joints in its inventory, and says the platform provides "near real-time on-scene intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities."." The RC-135 family of reconnaissance airframes carried a mission crew of more than two dozen people."

(Source: Stock picture of an RC-135V/W Rivet Joint. *USAF)*


RIVET JOINT Overview
Airborne Cryptologic Language Analysts
Management positions include the Data Link Operator, the Airborne Analyst, Airborne Mission Supervisor and the Information Integration Officer followed by the Crypto Linguists. The operators will provide indications and warnings to supported assets for threat avoidance and battlespace awareness
Electronic Warfare Operators
Crew of three focused on collection of Electronic Order of Battle info
Flight Deck
Normal crew is two pilots, one navigator; augmented crew allows for longer sortie duration
Airborne Systems Engineers
Troubleshoot and maintain airborne collection and communications systems
Signals Search and Development Operator
Analyzes the SIGINT environment for new or unusual emitters or communications systems
(U) RC-135 internal PED ensures critical intelligence to warfighter
Breaking Barriers ... Since 1947

An [Air Force briefing](#) slide offering a breakdown of a typical Rivet Joint crew. The note at the bottom refers to the plane's ability to perform "processing, exploitation, and dissemination," or PED, of intelligence data on board and then send that information along in near-real time.Source: ***USAF***

As can be seen above there are a minimum 14 analysts, operators, crew members that operate this intelligence collections and analysis apparatus. To read more about this specific operation or to learn more about the RC-135 and its capabilities check out my SOURCE by clicking HERE.

"According to the map, the plane stayed in the international airspace and did not fly to the northern end of the Gulf, where flying is prohibited by Mexico's territorial sea. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, states have the right to establish the breadth of their territorial seas up to 13.8 miles from their coast and govern sovereignty over the airspace above the territorial sea."("MSN," n.d.)

Even further reporting by the media. asserts that the Central Intelligence (CIA) has already ramped up its UAS drone missions by employing the use of MQ-9 Reapers for ISR. Apparently they have confirmed this and stated, they have tripled the number of collections passes/sorties they complete daily. The combination of both these sophisticated air ISR assets (RC-135 & MQ-9) is proof that operations are in motion. Again, the news coverage alone could be a media "psyop" in order to influence cartel actions while shaping the operating environment(OE). Other significant sources stated that these types of aircraft are primary means for Signals intelligence collection operations,personnel have the means to decrypting and interpreting cellphone, radio and radar signals that have been intercepted from an adversary.

General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper Drone (Picture source: General Atomics)

Another capability that the MQ-9 Reaper offers is the use of sensor technology package payload. Essentially there are “sniffer” type sensors in use on the reapers. These sensors are collecting and then analyzing air and gas samples, collected by searching for key chemical signatures, which are high probability indicators of fentanyl production labs being present in the vicinity. Sensed chemical components coupled with historical wind & direction data, can help assist our operations forces fully pin-point, with significant accuracy, the general area where these fentanyl labs are located. Currently, these UAS that are operating are not armed with munitions, so they do not have the current capacity to fire on targets, but, when the mission objectives change at a later date and the script says to actively engage these pre-identified target packages, the missions will flow with ease when targeted these clandestine labs with precision, kinetic, drone strikes, that's when the party begins. These high end fentanyl detection

technologies are a game changer, not only for the US, but primarily for Mexican Law Enforcement and their abilities to now locate the many clandestine laboratories located in several regions throughout the country and its vast territories.

In order to operate and support US and Mexican ground operations Special Forces should be tasked with the following efforts. USASOC and SF capabilities combined and paired with CIA, DIA and ISA intelligence lateral support, along with other mission support assets such as the DTRA HAZMAT specialist for drug lab seizure and investigation having worked with DTRA they are also highly desirable as they have the required skillset to handle clandestine laboratory seizures. Once Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is solid, further military operations can move forward, like psyops .

Another analyst's interpretation of current landscape:

"The Six Mexican Cartels, MS-13, and Tren de Aragua made big money in Human Trafficking.
With President Trump shutting the border and declaring the eight groups as terrorist organizations, the game is on.
The Cartels now have lost their major revenue other than Fentanyl and their fighters are going unpaid.
Bad things happen when Cartel soldiers are not paid.
There have now been several incidents since December when Americans of Mexican heritage were killed inside of Mexico visiting relatives.
These attacks include

- Antonio Céspedes Saldierna ran over an IED in late February 2025 — which authorities suspect was planted by a drug cartel on his ranch in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas. The blast also killed Horacio Lopez Peña, and Lopez's wife, Ninfa Griselda Ortega, sustained injuries and has been hospitalized.
- On December 30, 2024, Jesus Macias was killed when he failed to stop at improvised checkpoint set up by the drug cartels.
- On December 13, 2024, a U.S. Couple was shot and killed in Mexico.
- In December 2024, Vincente Peña Jr., from Chicago, was visiting family in Mexico. Peña, his brother Antonio Fernandez and another family member were shot and killed. Peña's teenage son is also now in a coma in a Mexican hospital.

There are likely more that have not been clearly communicated and reported.
The Cartel war against Americans has started, and will likely pick up the pace.
President Trump has vowed "ruthlessly, aggressive" actions to eradicate the threat by the cartels who are planning armed drone strikes on U.S. Border Patrol vehicles."

UPDATE: 03/14/2025
Although the above stated “other analyst” facts are true, I do not believe it is the intention of any cartel faction to engage the U.S government or its military in full-scale battle or any form of direct action at this particular time, although it may be a pipedream of individual members. I say this because cartels are a business and any physical engagement or skirmish endangers their business model or its operations. It makes more sense to me that the strongest cartel factions will concede to the US, but the US will have to let the cartels continue to operate without fentanyl as their prime product. Deals will be struck as diplomacy is restored, however violence will likely continue to take place in small pockets before this occurs. Shienbaum has recently turned over to the US, 29 members of the various cartels for prosecution. J.R

If efforts at some point require a further ramp up in nature/ Security Forces Assistance Brigades (SFABS) are another military option/tool in the furtherance of Security Assistance which falls under the banner of Security Cooperation. These are largely and successfully used in other regions of South American like Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.

SIGNIFICANT ESCALATION OR RESISTANCE-
ADDITIONAL ASSETS- SFABS



Image Source:(Thornhill 2021)

The 2018 National Security Strategy (NSS) identified a U.S. strategy centered on competition as the response to increasing threats from near-peer competitors globally. Furthermore, the 2018 NSS codified the mechanism to assist partners and allies to increase their capacity and capabilities and to achieve strategic partnerships. The SFAB advances American influence by building effective, long-lasting relationships and preserves peace through strength that is grounded in preserving shared national security interests. SFAB units (brigade, battalion, company, teams) exercise regional specialization capable of employment over large geographical areas simultaneously to cultivate strategic partnerships that provide tangible proof of U.S. commitment to regional stability and mitigate influence from potential Adversaries (Thornhill 2021)

Assessing the OE and Making Security Cooperation

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 mandated the Department of Defense (DoD) take necessary steps to identify a “return on investment” regarding security cooperation

programs. In response, DoD Instruction 5132.14, Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Security Cooperation Programs, outlines the steps the DoD must take to ensure SC programs are effective. One function of the SFAB is to conduct environmental, institutional, operational, and organizational assessments of FSF from the tactical through strategic levels. These assessments provide the necessary data for an SFAB commander to make informed security cooperation recommendations to the combatant command, joint force commander, and/or country team. By thoroughly understanding the OE and its effect on the FSF,

SFAB commanders leverage the personal relationships built with their counterparts to influence their actions leading to improved conditions that may otherwise adversely affect both the FSF and advising teams.(Thornhill 2021) Mitigating Influence: Increasing Capacity, Capability, and Interoperability Deterring transnational threats is accomplished through security cooperation programs and initiatives. Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation, states, "Through complementary efforts of the Joint force, other U.S. Government agencies, and assuring partners and allies, unity of effort will be the main driver of mitigating the effects of adversaries around the globe." Advisors achieve unity of effort between FSF, U.S., joint, and coalition forces by negotiating access to joint enablers (support role) for FSF partners and acting as liaison (liaise role) from the tactical through strategic levels within FSF headquarters, coalition headquarters, and embassies. As part of a whole-of-government approach to stability, the advising team, alongside their FSF counterparts, maintains a persistent presence in regions deemed vital to U.S. interests while providing tangible reassurance of U.S.

resolve. Improving PN capability and capacity while achieving interoperability increases FSF confidence and demonstrates that the U.S. is committed to regional security and stability.(Thornhill 2021)



1st Security Force Assistance Brigade partnerships have spanned many foreign security force partners within the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility in Latin America. 1st SFAB teams remain persistently employed in Columbia, Honduras, and Panama with the primary goals of training, advising, assisting, and building interoperability with our partners from competition to crisis to conflict. Advisors travel episodically to four other countries in Latin America, including Guyana and Paraguay, to further our security force assistance mission in the region.


XX
1st Special Forces Command (Airborne)
FORT BRAGG (NC)
389th Military Intel. Bn
FORT BRAGG (NC)
1st Special Forces Group (Pacific Region)
HQ & HQ Company FORT LEWIS (WA)
1st Battalion OKINAWA (JAPAN)
2nd Battalion FORT LEWIS (WA)
3rd Battalion FORT LEWIS (WA)
4th Battalion FORT LEWIS (WA)
Group Support Co. FORT LEWIS (WA)
3rd Special Forces Group (Sub-Saharan Africa)
HQ & HQ Company FORT BRAGG (NC)
1st Battalion FORT BRAGG (NC)
2nd Battalion FORT BRAGG (NC)
3rd Battalion FORT BRAGG (NC)
4th Battalion FORT BRAGG (NC)
Group Support Co. FORT BRAGG (NC)
5th Special Forces Group (Middle East, Central Asia)
HQ & HQ Company FORT CAMPBELL (KY)
1st Battalion FORT CAMPBELL (KY)
2nd Battalion FORT CAMPBELL (KY)
3rd Battalion FORT CAMPBELL (KY)
4th Battalion FORT CAMPBELL (KY)
Group Support Co. FORT CAMPBELL (KY)
7th Special Forces Group (Latin America, Caribbean)
HQ & HQ Company EGLIN AFB (FL)
1st Battalion EGLIN AFB (FL)
2nd Battalion EGLIN AFB (FL)
3rd Battalion EGLIN AFB (FL)
4th Battalion EGLIN AFB (FL)
Group Support Co EGLIN AFB (FL)
10th Special Forces Group (Europe, Northern Africa)
HQ & HQ Company FORT CARSON (CO)
1st Battalion STUTTGART (GER)
2nd Battalion FORT CARSON (CO)
3rd Battalion FORT CARSON (CO)
4th Battalion FORT CARSON (CO)
Group Support Co FORT CARSON (CO)
19th SF Group (ARNG) (Southeast Asia, Pacific)
HQ & HQ Company RIVERTON (UT)
1st Battalion RIVERTON (UT)
2nd Battalion KENOVA (WV)
5th Battalion WATKINS (CO)
Group Support Co. RIVERTON (UT)
20th SF Group (ARNG) (Latin America)
HQ & HQ Company BIRMINGHAM (AL)
1st Battalion HUNTSVILLE (AL)
2nd Battalion JACKSON (MS)
3rd Battalion STARKE (FL)
Group Support Co BIRMINGHAM (AL)
4th PsyOps Group FORT BRAGG (NC)
Headquarters & Headquarters Company
3rd PsyOps Battalion Dissemination
5th PsyOps Battalion EJCOM
7th PsyOps Battalion AFRICOM
8th PsyOps Battalion CENTCOM
8th PsyOps Group FORT BRAGG (NC)
Headquarters & Headquarters Company
1st PsyOps Battalion SOUTHCOM
5th PsyOps Battalion PACOM
9th PsyOps Battalion Tactical
95th Civil Affairs Brigade FORT BRAGG (NC)
Headquarters & Headquarters Company
91st Civil Affairs Battalion AFRICOM
92nd Civil Affairs Battalion EUCOM
96th Civil Affairs Battalion CENTCOM
97th Civil Affairs Battalion PACOM
98th Civil Affairs Battalion SOUTHCOM
528th Sustainment Bde FORT BRAGG (NC)
112th Special Operations Signal Battalion
Special Troops Battalion
6x Army SOF Liaison Elements
Army SOF Support Operations Cell
2x Medical Role I Teams

The unit will continue to employ force packages in eight month intervals in support of partners in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The unit will continue its partnerships with Columbia, Honduras, and Panama, focusing on the institutional domain, integration of operations, intelligence, and sustainment, and building staff processes. The organization will continue to employ episodically to several Central and South American countries as it helps expand U.S. interests in the AOR. This expansion will increase advisor presence, build interoperability and partner capacity, and maintain the U.S. as the partner of choice.

The 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade organizes, trains, advises, and supports foreign security forces in coordination with joint, interagency, and multinational forces to improve partner capability and capacity and facilitate achievement of US strategic objectives.

SFABS RECRUITMENT CONTACT INFORMATION

- 1st SFAB: Fort Moore, Georgia, operating in SOUTHCOM: usarmy.moore.1-sfa-bde.mbx.talent-management-and-recruiting@army.mil
- 2nd SFAB: Fort Liberty, North Carolina, AFRICOM: usarmy.liberty.2-sfa-bde.mbx.recruiting@army.mil
- 3rd SFAB: Fort Cavazos, Texas, CENTCOM: usarmy.cavazos.3-sfa-bde.mbx.3-sfab-atac@army.mil
- 4th SFAB: Fort Carson, Colorado, EUCOM: usarmy.carson.forscom.list.4-sfab-recruiting@army.mil

- 5th SFAB: Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, INDOPACOM: usarmy.jblm.5-sfa-bde.list.5sfab-recruiting1@army.mil

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Undecided? Write the SFAC Recruiting Team:
usarmy.liberty.forscom.mbx.sfac-recruiting-accessions-group@army.mil
("Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs)" 2021) (SFAC and SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE COMMAND 2023)

****The following press releases relate to the U.S. Northern Command efforts to support the Department of Homeland Security (lead federal agency) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection mission to secure the southern border. ****

March 17, 2025: **Engineer, aviation, medical troops to enhance southern border security operations > U.S. Northern Command > Press Releases**

March 15, 2025: **USS Gravely deploys to U.S. Northern Command Area of Responsibility**

March 14, 2025: **New joint task force established to lead USNORTHCOM efforts on s/ border**

March 11, 2025: **Engineer, intelligence troops to enhance southern border security operations**

March 1, 2025: **Additional troops to enhance border security operations**

Feb. 28, 2025: **Sustainment support units set to enhance southern border mission**

Feb. 19, 2025: **Readout of U.S. Northern Command Commander Gen. Gregory M. Guillot's Meeting with General Ricardo Trevilla Trejo, Secretary of National Defense of Mexico (Defensa) Regarding Cooperative Activities Along the United States and Mexico Border**

Feb. 19, 2025: **USNORTHCOM sends Commander's Estimate to Pentagon**

Feb. 4, 2025: **U.S. Northern Command announces Joint Task Force Headquarters, intel support**

Jan. 24, 2025: **Active-duty forces to bolster security at U.S. southern border**

Jan. 23, 2025: **USNORTHCOM bolsters security at southern border**

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